EDUCATION FOR PEACE

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BY

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CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, NEW YORK

1949

A

NOTE

This little book deals with the everlasting problem of war and peace. My main proposition is that mankind must be predisposed for peace by the right kind of education. It would have been simpler to leave that argument in the air, but since war is an immediate threat I have thought it honest not to disguise my pacifist sentiments, for education for peace will only get a chance if in the meantime we refrain from war.

Four of these papers were originally delivered in 1947 or 1948 as lectures in various parts of the world—Sweden, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Belgium and the United States of America. The final essay was originally published by the Freedom Press (London) as a separate pamphlet. For a more complete statement of the theory of education which lies at the basis of them all, the reader is referred to the author's previous book, *Education Through Art*.

We stopped in the thicket beyond the threshing-floor at the very end of the village. Sämka picked up a dry stick from the snow and began striking it against the frosty trunk of a lime tree. Hoar frost fell from the branches onto our caps, and the noise of the blows resounded in the stillness of the wood.

'Lëv Nikoláevich,' said Fédka to me . . . 'why does one learn singing? I often think, why, really, does one?'

What made him jump from the terror of the murder to this question, heaven only knows; yet by the tone of his voice, the seriousness with which he demanded an answer, and the attentive silence of the other two, one felt that there was some vital and legitimate connection between this question and our preceding talk.

TOLSTOY

(*trans.* Aylmer Maude)

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INTRODUCTION: THERE IS NOW NO OTHER WAY

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WAR has now entered into its final phase of evolution. It may still be represented as a struggle for mastery or domination, for material gain or ideological satisfaction, but now it offers, as the outcome of engaging in it, an alternative of bare survival or annihilation. The war of 1939–45 left the combatants in various degrees of exhaustion—even Germany was far from complete annihilation and the United States were relatively unscathed. But the latest developments of aerial bombardment carry with them the probability of *obliteration*, particularly for any compact area such as an island within reach of mass bombardment from an adjacent continent. Within a large land-mass, a people might conceivably leave their large cities and centres of communication and disperse before they could be contained within a convenient "box." The island of Great Britain is already such a box, and from the European mainland could be subjected to what is technically known as a box-barrage of aerial torpedoes, atomic bombs, germs and viruses of disease, and whatever further weapons of destruction are in store for it. Its inhabitants might save themselves by becoming

cavemen, abandoning from now onwards their grandiose plans for "reconstruction" in order to dig instead sufficient (and sufficiently deep) underground shelters to house fifty million people—fifty million people who must be immediately persuaded to revert to the brutish existence of the Stone Age. Not *quite* so brutish, of course; for our caves, like Henry Miller's America, will be "air-conditioned."

Actually even such caves would be no protection. Men, like wasps and weasels, can be smoked out. Deep shelters will be mantraps or tombs. There is no salvation in defence, and effective counter-attack is excluded. An island cannot compete, in atomic war, with a continent. For England, a future war against a mainland power would mean obliteration, "atomization." It is the relatively small and compact countries like England and Japan that are most vulnerable to this new weapon.

We already recognize that the only conceivable next war is a war against Russia—or against the European continent unified under Russia. But why is such a war "conceivable"? It takes two to make a war—why should Russia wish to make war against Britain or the United States, or the United States or Britain against Russia?

We can fall back on ideological explanations, but we know that they are false. There is only one reality in this human crisis—the desire to survive, and, having survived, to live in security with an ever-rising standard of comfort.

When, as now more and more frequently, we speak of Russian imperialism, we may have a slightly uneasy feeling that the word is misapplied. It is not "the white man's burdens" which the Soviets wish to add to their

Union—they already have enough burdens on their backs to absorb all their potential energies. Nor does it seem that the Soviets wish to acquire dominion over the *minds* of other peoples—Communism, as a social ideal, is anyhow dead in Russia, and Trotsky was its last prophet. What the Russians profess to want is "security"—security of frontiers. But what precisely is a secure frontier in the terms of future warfare? The only realistic answer to that question would seem to be: a continuous coastline with its adjacent islands.

The only frontier which Russia can regard as permanently secure is the coastline of the land-complex made up of the three continents, Europe, Asia, and Africa. Any area less than this will always contain a soft spot, an Achilles' heel. The present rulers of Russia have geodetic vision: they are literally "far-sighted." I do not believe that they conceive "security" on any less inclusive scale than this half-of-the-world.

Outside this land-complex there exists only one other land-complex—the Americas, with Australasia.

(Let us note incidentally that these two land-complexes are internally self-sufficient: each could practice self-sufficiency or autarky without the slightest inconvenience. Any divergences in the standard of living would in the end be of kind rather than degree. The only factor which might call for differential control within either sphere would be birth control. I ignore the remoter possibility that certain elements, such as uranium, which might play a decisive role in the development of power, are unevenly distributed between the two hemispheres, and might therefore become a cause of disequilibrium.)

Against this wider vision, which all evidence sug-

gests is the practical policy of the Soviet state, any talk of "appeasement" or "effective resistance" is parochial, the language of a vanished world. Appeasement would have to continue until the Russian ideal of world security had become a reality. "Effective" resistance, which is represented as the only alternative,[1] means armed resistance. When an expanding force, which in the field of international politics we are accustomed to call imperialistic, meets with armed resistance, the result is inevitably war.

In a mood which ought to be chastened by the recognition of all these facts, let us examine the only practical policy which can be pursued. Appeasement, which means putting off the evil day, is no policy. Effective resistance merely hastens on the evil day. The evil day is the day on which the next war breaks out, and that day is a day of annihilation for an island fortress. Someone has said that Great Britain is destined to be the Malta of the next war, but Malta, under a rain of atomic bombs, would have been dispersed as volcanic dust into the waters of the Mediterranean.

There is one policy left for us to consider—some form of negative or passive resistance—a refusal to obey. War is a contract or a conspiracy between all those who engage in it—we use phrases like "unity in a time of national emergency" to describe such a contract. We can, as individuals, refuse to enter into such a contract. But those who have already advocated this policy obscure their purpose by using several terms indiscriminately—"passive resistance," "non-violent resistance," "refusal to obey," "non-resistance to evil." The first three describe a physical attitude accompanied by a positive aim—a strike

(refusal to work in order to obtain material satisfaction), a refusal to obey a call-up notice or a military command. Such an attitude may have a religious, a philosophical, or a political sanction: it is essentially part of a practical policy, and it *may* involve unarmed physical resistance. The fourth term belongs properly to Oriental and Christian mysticism and describes a spiritual attitude accompanied by a negative aim. Evil is not to be overcome by practical action, but by the attainment of a certain beatitude or state of grace which can endure the experience of evil, just as the martyr's hand could endure the flames.

I do not propose to enter into all the ethical arguments for these various forms of action. They have been discussed with clear and simple reasonableness by Tolstoy in *The Kingdom of God Is Within You.* Such an ethical approach is still valid, and will be natural to certain minds. But for the moment I am anxious to discover practical or rational grounds for adopting one or other of these attitudes. One or the other will be appropriate in a particular situation. In the face of aggression it is possible that we should adopt a policy of non-resistance. Against the intention of our own State to organize effective resistance to such aggression, it is possible we should adopt a policy of passive resistance. The two policies are complementary.

Aggressiveness is an evil in the ethical or religious sense, but recent research has tended to bring it within the sphere of psychological therapy. The impulse to violence which gathers in the individual mind and breaks out in unnatural gusts of passion is a psychosis, and its origins are open to analysis. Such analysis points to certain deprivations, absences of satisfaction, unconsciously

accumulated clouds of frustration, all of which may have economic or superstitious sanctions or symptoms, but which in their mode of operation are essentially psychological. Aggressiveness is a basic element in human psychology: but its origins are now understood and its social repercussions might be controlled if proper conditions were provided, and if upbringing and education were to guide the child into ways of love and serenity. We must learn to recognize the first symptoms of aggressiveness as they reveal themselves already within the family circle, for these are significant and may be the forerunners of social aggression.[2] For the moment, however, I would like to leave on one side all these questions of social adjustment and group therapy, and even the pressing question of educational reform, with which this book is mainly concerned, all of which are necessary for the building-up of a new world order. It is essential to make a beginning with such reforms, but we cannot wait for their inevitably slow maturation. Before this could take place, and become effective throughout the world, aggression would have reached another climax and the annihilation of our civilization would have become a reality. We must realize that the immediate situation calls for urgent measures—that *now* is a time of prevalent ill-will and wickedness. In this immediate situation we cannot escape a personal decision. We can individually acquiesce in the aggressive impulses that threaten to overwhelm us as nations or groups of nations; or we can resolutely disown all deeds of violence. Our first duty is to learn to recognize the early symptoms of aggressiveness in ourselves, for very likely we have not had the kind of upbringing which would have led us away

from hatred and resentment and given us a loving and understanding attitude towards other people.

Having recognized the seeds of aggressiveness which may be present in our minds, the next and most difficult discipline which we will have to learn is abstention from judgment. This discipline, which is one of the clearest and most often repeated precepts of Taoist, Confucian and Christian ethics, is perhaps the one which the modern world most frequently ignores. But a little reflection will show us that judgment is in effect the first phase of aggression. In relation to another group or nation, it is an incipient act of war.

Today, we are asked to judge Russia. We are told, perhaps, that the régime which Stalin has created, with its police terror, its forced labor camps, its huge and increasing class differences, its denial of the most elementary civic and individual liberties, its monolithic political structure, its crude nationalism, is a totalitarian dictatorship of such moral turpitude that no decent democrat can conceivably collaborate with it in any permanent and organic fashion. But at the same time the judges of Russia (Koestler, for example) recognize that the only alternative to such organic and permanent collaboration is some form of "effective resistance"—which means war. Between war and collaboration there exist only various glassy slopes called appeasement, conciliation, agreed spheres of influence, etc., which offer no firm foothold, but involve a more or less precipitate slither to one or other extreme.

So long as conditions exist in one country which offend the moral sense (not to speak of the material interests) of another country, there can be no question of

permanent and organic collaboration between those two countries. Great Britain can collaborate with the United States because, although the two countries may have economic differences, there is a common sense of justice and an identity of cultural heritage. These act as social buffers or shock-absorbers. Most people in Great Britain are profoundly shocked by the American attitude toward Negroes, in so far as they have any real knowledge of it. Americans are scandalized by our slums, annoyed by the social snobbery of our upper classes and by the persistence of class distinctions in a professed democracy. But each side can to a certain extent welcome the other side's criticism because of the prevailing goodwill, and because each side has a highly developed sense of self-criticism. The same free and friendly exchange of criticism is not possible between an open society such as Britain or America and a closed society such as the U.S.S.R. The reason is quite simple: the U.S.S.R. does not permit criticism within its own totalitarian régime. External criticism finds no bond of sympathy: it can be directed only against the State—it is therefore liable to aggressive interpretation. The American criticism of Britain, or the British criticism of America, is always interpretable as the criticism of a group of individuals, of a part within the whole. But our criticism of Russia must necessarily be the criticism of the whole: that is the logic of totalitarianism.

We cannot renounce our criticism of Russia, and because Russia cannot "take" our criticism, there can be no identity of purpose, no organic collaboration between the two countries. Before we could collaborate in any but an opportunist spirit, we would have to say to Russia: Abolish your concentration camps, which con-

tain so many of our political and religious comrades; restore liberty of expression, so that we may know the truth of what men are thinking and feeling in your country; guarantee the right of self-determination to all the peoples you hold under military domination. But Russia would not do any of these things—or, shall we say, she would not regard them as "practical politics" in the immediate future. Therefore, in the immediate future there can be no sense of organic collaboration between us.

I have said we must not judge Russia, yet I have also said that we cannot renounce our criticism of Russia. There would seem to be some contradiction here, but actually an essential difference exists between judgment and criticism. Christ said: "Judge not, and ye shall not be judged: condemn not, and ye shall not be condemned: forgive, and ye shall be forgiven." In the act of judgment, condemnation is implied; criticism invites discussion.

We must not make too much play with these words, for they are used indifferently and it would be impossible to establish an agreed usage which made a clear distinction between their meanings. But there is a great difference between the two possible attitudes which I am trying to define. To criticize is to analyze and understand: to understand is to forgive (not in the sense of forgetting, but of forgoing judgment). Understanding is a passive attitude, an objective relation to facts clearly perceived. Condemnation is a subjective relation to facts which may or may not be clearly perceived, and it is essentially an active attitude (if the action is merely one of self-withdrawal, it is action nevertheless and we call it priggishness).

A physician analyzes a diseased limb—diagnoses it and attempts to heal it. He does not find the disease revolting: he does not condemn the disease as such, though he may say to the patient: "Sacrifice your limb, otherwise your life will be endangered." But his object is not to judge the sick man, and he will not even criticize his way of life, supposing that to have been responsible for the sickness. He does not import morality into the art of healing. But he would scarcely devote himself to his arduous duties did he not love mankind. He loves or sympathizes with that which is sick and diseased. Our attitude should be the same in politics. We should try to understand the body politic of Russia, to analyze its diseases with the objectivity of a physician; but we should not pass judgment on that body. We should make our diagnosis and do no more unless the patient asks for our help, our healing power. We have no right to impose our remedies on reluctant bodies. Our first duty as social physicians is to heal ourselves, and to heal others only out of the superabundance of our own health. For if we are healthy as a people and another people is ill, and if this people believes in our power of healing, then our innocent health will itself be a healing power. A healthy people, not conscious of any mission, but living innocently and with superabundant vitality, would gradually instill health into the whole community of nations. Health is infectious.

The statement of our understanding: that should be the nature and extent of our criticism. But our understanding should embrace the good as well as the evil in our neighbors, and there is much good in Russia. There is goodness in the common people, in their peace-time

activities, in their struggle with nature, in their emotional disposition toward one another. There is good in many of their institutions, founded and maintained for communal ends and not for private aggrandisement. Above all, there is good in their great heritage of national culture, which comes to us across the barriers of time and space, of language and customs. We have a common bond with Russia in the imaginative creations of their great writers: Pushkin, Turgenev, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Chekhov, and Gorky—just as the Russian people have a common bond with us in the imaginative creations of our great writers: Shakespeare, Swift, Byron, Shelley, Dickens and Whitman. We have similar bonds in music and painting, in all the arts. An Englishman steeped in the tradition of Russian literature cannot *hate* Russia: on the contrary, he must love her with the deepest understanding and sympathy. The particular philosophical outlook which I personally profess owes more to Russians (to Dostoevsky, Tolstoy and Kropotkin) than to our own writers. Equally, no Russian at all sensitive to the beauty and profundity of Shakespeare's art can *hate* England; for Shakespeare is England.

But let us return to the immediate necessities. A new generation must come forward, recognizing that the majority of their elders, here and in every civilized community, is dangerously infected with aggressive impulses. The older generations are perhaps beyond redemption: the gorge rises instinctively whenever, across their neurotic minds, some barrier of frustration momentarily falls. They are not accustomed to reason: they see red. They should be regarded, therefore, as dangerous old men, and the young men—all those young enough to be free of

war-guilt—should do their best to render them harmless by depriving them of office and of the instruments of power. There is no superstition more fallacious than that which ascribes wisdom to old men, or which makes goodness and greatness the products of experience. The great man, said Mencius, is one who has never lost the heart of a child. But such great men do not exist in our Western civilization, or if they do exist, are never recognized as great. Our great men are opportunists, their minds crooked because of the diplomacy and dissembling which they have habitually practised, and their so-called wisdom is but a high degree of cunning and deceitfulness. But it is only in degree that they differ from the crowds they lead in peace and war: flocks of indoctrinated sheep, which yet have the capacity to transform themselves into packs of wolves.

Plato once suggested that a new generation, properly educated according to his principles, would have to exile the old men, to put them on some remote Aegean island. That might have been a simple solution for a city state, but there is no island big enough to hold all the old men of the modern world. They are the majority, and in most countries their number, proportionately to younger men, increases every year.

For many reasons, an efficient military machine must be operated by young men. It is not possible to make an army, much less a navy or an air force, out of old men. All military forces are based on the groundwork of discipline, and discipline can be effectively taught only to youthful minds and pliant bodies. It is not merely a question of discipline—it is a question of nerves. A fighter pilot is finished by the age of twenty-five.

A military force can be commanded by old men, but its substance is youth. By effectively withholding themselves from military service, the younger generation could bring the whole crazy structure, the *obsolete* structure of armed force, to ruins. That should be the first operation in any constructive campaign of resistance.

Almost every nation in the world is faced by a demand for the indefinite continuation of military conscription. Even the Socialist and Communist parties, the parties which profess to believe in universal brotherhood, acquiesce in a policy of conscription. Why flesh and blood should be conscripted to resist atomization is not yet explained. The supposition is rather that the maintenance of a large standing army and a fully equipped air force is justified in expectation of a conflict with Russia. The atomic bomb has put that argument out of court. Conceivably a nation should conscript its scientists. Any other form of conscription can have only one eventuality in view—the need for suppressing an insurrection of the people. Henceforth a standing army stands only against the people from whom it is drawn. It is a political and not a military weapon.

The younger generation must make up their own minds about this issue of conscription: a moral decision is involved. It is equally a rational decision and it would be invidious for a representative of an exempted generation to bring any emotional pressure to bear on the issue. If young Englishmen comply, if they agree to be drafted into the armed forces which are to offer "effective resistance" to Russia, then they are engaging in a military conspiracy which can end only in the obliteration of their island home. They do not need a conscript force

to protect their property in West Africa or Malaya; they do not need three million, two million, one million, or even a thousand men in arms to sanction the just causes which they represent before a council of nations. The case is not different for young Americans, young Frenchmen, young Russians—for the youth of any nation. Justice is its own recruiting sergeant, and those who are in the right shall command the support of all like-minded members of that council. They will be in a majority and their just cause will prevail without resort to arms—unless there is a big bad wolf at the council table who cares nothing for justice and is merely intent on their destruction. Would it not be better, in such circumstances, to trust to God and keep our powder for fireworks?

In short, power, in so far as it is militant, is a dangerous myth. It exists, but only on the moral plane. It no longer exists on the material plane because technical inventions have transformed power into an instrument of self-destruction. To refuse to recognize that fact is simply unrealistic.

If power is an illusion, why should we rely on it any longer? But it is worse than an illusion—it is an hallucination which invites suicide. If we do not quickly divest ourselves of the instruments of power, we shall be the first victims of their application.

Before the Second World War, we were asked to become pacifists in the name of Christ, in the name of reason, in the cause of human brotherhood. Now we must become pacifists in the name of realism, as logical thinkers who see that only by refusing to offer effective resistance to evil can we escape evil. It would be rather more inspir-

ing, perhaps, to suggest that we offer no resistance to evil in the pure spirit of Christ's idealism—to suggest with Péguy, that we should not despair of the goodness of God.[3] Perhaps twenty thousand, perhaps a hundred thousand would respond to such an appeal. But it is necessary to move millions, most of whom would turn a deaf ear to Christ Himself (and be encouraged in the act by Christ's self-elected ministers). We must therefore try to find a more rational basis for our appeal. Peace must be a pragmatic project.

That project I call "education for peace." What is meant by such a phrase I explain in the next chapter, and the chapters which follow carry the argument into the practical sphere of pedagogics. But war is an immediate danger which threatens to overwhelm all schemes that aim at the betterment of mankind, and against that danger I can bring forward only an absolute negation of war. But passive resistance to war is neither an idle nor a hopeless policy. It is a policy that lies within the capacity of all those who are called upon to carry out the policy of war. Power in this sense—negating power—is in the hands of youth, and it is an absolute power—the only power that cannot corrupt those who exercise it. Why this power has never been exercised seemed an inexplicable mystery to Tolstoy, and might still seem a mystery to us today had not Gandhi, inspired by Tolstoy, made nonviolent resistance a living reality among the practical policies of world politics. It is perhaps too early to say that Gandhi has finally triumphed against the policy of power. Even now that India is free from the dominance of a foreign power, she still has to free herself from the hatred and aggressiveness within her own borders. But

those internal evils can also be met in a spirit of non-violent resistance, and a force that has made India independent will make her pacific.

Passive resistance, it will be said, should be practised first where military aggression is most rampant—in Russia. Even if this is true (and I should suspect that aggression as a collective psychosis is fairly evenly distributed throughout the civilized world) it is a profound misunderstanding of the psychology of the process to suppose that it can be used as a counter in some war of nerves. We should remember the parable of the mote and the beam. It is precisely at this point that the complementary doctrine of non-resistance to evil comes into force. A pacifist could not recommend his policy were he not profoundly convinced that peace unto death is more effective as a policy than war unto death.

It might be argued that the youth of Europe and America is not spiritual enough to generate the *mystique* of passive resistance. It might be argued that this same youth is nevertheless intelligent enough to see in passive resistance its only chance of survival. In any case, we who have brought the world literally to the dark edge of nothingness can but entrust the future to those whose living concern it might be, realizing that while we tremble and would inevitably fall, their fresh nerves may yet be capable of instinctive balance.

To arrest a fall into the abyss may not seem to be a very positive aim to set before youth: it is, however, that negation of negations after which creative action once more becomes possible. That fall arrested, education for a world at peace becomes a possibility.

II

EDUCATION FOR PEACE

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EDUCATION for peace—this phrase might be used to describe two very different aims. We might mean a process of education designed to make men more peaceful. Such education would have to be reformative, even, in the psychological sense, a method of healing. But we might mean a process of education designed for men at peace. We then assume that the world has been restored to sanity, and our aim is to keep the peace, to bring up children in a positive frame of mind, in social unity and creative activity.

To make men peaceful is the aim of the pacifist; and the pacifist might claim that it is also his aim to keep men peaceful. But the motives as well as the means may differ for such different ends. We must try to encompass both ends, but at least let us admit that a difference exists between the transitional propaganda of pacifism and the permanent needs of peace.

Pacifism was always an ambiguous word: it suggests a belief in peace, but how can one believe in anything so negative? Our pacifism is really based on a hatred of war, but to hate war is an emotional attitude, an attitude which may well be a reaction to experience, but which is no

basis for a positive philosophy. War itself is not a simple phenomenon: it inspires comradeship, altruism, courage, many individual and social virtues which are sadly lacking in time of peace. But war involves destruction, more particularly the destruction of human life, and that fact is perhaps the fundamental one for the pacifist. His fundamental belief is in the sanctity of human life.

I would like to begin by asking whether this belief in the sanctity of human life is rational. Human life is limited in span, and life itself is prolific. Whether one human life extends to twenty or thirty or seventy years does not seem to matter much in a numerical calculation of millions. Even when the toll of war is reckoned in tens of millions, it makes no permanent difference to the sum total of human life. Or, to express the same cynicism in another way, it makes no difference to life itself whether a toll is taken in war or disease or famine. War, from the biological point of view, is not to be differentiated from any other check on the propagation of the species. It used to bear heavily on the males of the race, but in future it will show no sexual partiality.

We cannot take the tragic element out of life. But I am afraid that that is the subconscious wish of many pacifists. They shut their eyes to the irrational, the incalculable, the fatalistic element in human life: they long for a dream existence of endless security and love. Such people are not realists: they deceive themselves, and death or disaster finds them unprepared. We may deplore war because it wastes life without reason: but to fear war simply because it brings death a little nearer is cowardice.

The fear of death is the most irrational of our fears, and the basis of our worst superstitions. This fear domi-

nates our lives to an extent which we do not readily admit, and it is very odd that modern psychologists, who have paid so much attention to the equally important subject of sex, have neglected the psychology of death—and this in spite of the fact, which Professor Flugel once noted, "that psychoanalysis has shown that in many important respects our attitude towards death is similar to that towards sex." [1] But as Flugel also remarks in this connection, there always has been a universal conspiracy of silence about death—"an obstinate refusal to accept the fact of natural death and an elaborate structure of magical belief and practice designed to bolster up this refusal—a magic which itself contains the beginnings of the healing art and of the science of medicine."

Freud, of course, was an exception: towards the end of his life, he concentrated more and more on the psychology of death, and even suggested the existence within man of a *death instinct*, "whose aim it was to abolish life once more and to re-establish the inorganic state of things." Freud supposed the existence of two groups of instincts: "the erotic instincts, which are always trying to collect living substance together into ever larger unities, and the death instincts which act against that tendency and try to bring living matter back into an inorganic condition. The co-operation and opposition of these two forces produce the phenomena of life to which death puts an end." [2]

I am not asking the reader to accept this, or any other theory about death: I am only suggesting that our attitude towards death must be a reasonable one, and that we must take care that our pacifism is not based merely on an irrational fear of death. The calm recogni-

tion of the inevitability of *natural* death is one of the foundations of wisdom. That recognition does not imply, of course, that we should accept with complacency an *unnatural* or avoidable death: indeed, the right to a natural term of life might well be our main claim.

But I have not done with the psychological aspects of our problem—indeed, let us admit that the whole problem is psychological, whether we look into the individual or into society. But psychology presents us with a dilemma. I think we must also admit that Freud and his followers have made out a scientific case for the existence of aggressive or destructive instincts, which instincts are an inevitable consequence of the infant's adaptation to external reality. Further, these psychologists have proved that unless these instincts have outlets, they are turned inwards, with disastrous effects on the rational behavior of the individual human being. A pacifist who denies the existence of aggressive impulses in himself is merely deceiving himself, and Edward Glover in his book entitled *War, Sadism and Pacifism* has taught us a salutary lesson in showing that there is a fundamental identity between *some* of the impulses promoting peace and the impulses giving rise to war. Pacifism should be, not a blind emotional opposition to war, but a plan for making our aggressive or destructive instincts non-lethal. Dr. Jung has recently suggested that the aggressive impulses of the peace-loving Swiss nation are fully discharged in local politics. It is certainly true that the local politics of some more aggressive nations are correspondingly tepid.

I have a considerable respect for modern psychology. Nevertheless, I would like to make one criticism, with particular reference to this problem of aggression.

The man of the psychologist is just as much a myth as the man of the economist; and though the psychologists are not so crude as the economists, and have admitted the existence of very diverse and even opposite types of human beings, nevertheless there are certain differences which they have not taken into account. If aggressive impulses are a natural product of the infant's adaptation to external reality, and, whether repressed or active, are an explanation of man's indulgence in war and warlike activities, how does it come about that whole classes of men are decidedly less aggressive than others? I am not referring merely to national groups like the Swiss, who have a record of limited historical duration, and who would certainly display war-like activities if sufficiently provoked; I have in mind vocational groups which overstep national boundaries and which greatly exceed the population of any nation. The most significant example is the peasant, the man occupied in the cultivation of the soil. Thomas Hardy gave a picture of him in his poem "In Time of 'The Breaking of Nations' ":

> Only a man harrowing clods
> In a slow silent walk
> With an old horse that stumbles and nods
> Half asleep as they stalk.
>
> Only thin smoke without flame
> From the heaps of couch grass:
> Yet this will go onward the same
> Though Dynasties pass . . .

The peasant is not aggressive—not, at least, in the corporate nationalistic sense which involves men in war. And yet we cannot assume that his infantile experiences

differ in any important respects from those of the town-bred proletarian or intellectual, who is such a vociferous militarist when war breaks out. We must conclude, therefore, that there is some factor in the peasant's upbringing, environment, or daily experience which discharges his aggressive impulses, which leaves him in a pacific state of mind.

It is an aspect of our problem which deserves investigation. That it has little to do with upbringing might be shown if we could be sure that country-born people, when they migrate to towns, still retain their peaceful natures. I do not think that could be proved. I believe, rather, that the aggressive impulses of the peasant are discharged against a permanent enemy which we generally call "Nature." The struggle against weather, against erosion, against weeds, is a struggle which fully engages whatever death instincts the average human being is endowed with. Anyone who spends long days hoeing sugar beets, slashing hedges, or mowing thistles has little taste for the bayonet. I know that the Englishman who shoots grouse or pheasants, or hunts the fox, is often a fierce and blood-thirsty militarist. But he is not the peasant: it is not the peasant who follows the hounds, but the idle gentry, the retired businessmen. The peasant has no leisure for such pursuits: his sadism is fully satisfied in a day-to-day struggle with the earth.

It is not, however, the hardness, the harshness, the exhausting nature of the peasant's work that makes him a man indifferent to war. It is something more profound: an active mingling of his body and spirit with the diurnal processes of the natural world. Copulation, birth and death are not mysteries to him: they are not bedroom

events—they are the daily substance of his life, the events which give rhythm to his existence. Man is, in a real sense, a part of the cosmic process.

> Man moulded with Earth
> Like clay uprisen. . . .

An ingrained sense of what one might call Mother Earth gives to the peasant a sense of security which is unknown to the city-dweller, whose existence depends on a cash nexus. City-dwellers, and the industrial proletariat in general, live under the fear of economic fluctuations—slumps which mean unemployment and his social outcasting. The peasant may suffer from fluctuations of prosperity, due to drought or storm; but these are disasters which spur him to further activity, to renewed aggression against the elements. The unemployed proletariat have no natural outlet for their aggressive impulses, and are therefore, as Hitler found, ever predisposed for war.

I do not think that peasants are the only natural pacifists—artists and craftsmen, all who are engaged in the actual shaping or manipulation of materials, in what we call *creative* activities, lack any evident desire to give expression to their destructive impulses. There may be other occupational groups of this kind, but I do not wish to make too many unwarranted assertions—I am asking for research into these possibilities.

Further evidence could be found by an analysis of vocational groups within the pacifist movement—taking care always to distinguish between the natural pacifist and the pacifist who is merely using the movement as an outlet for aggressive instincts. Equally valuable, of

course, would be an analysis of vocation in relation to aggressive impulses expressed in militarism or in international politics. Admitting that fundamentally we are all aggressive, yet the outlets found for our aggressive impulses vary from class to class, from period to period. But I think we might risk the generalization that wars are always made by idle people—meaning by "idle" people those not engaged in active muscular work. Wars in the past were made by kings and barons—idle people in this sense—and then by merchants and moneylenders, and now by politicians and journalists, and by the etiolated proletariat of the cities—the clerical and bureaucratic groups which are numbered in millions. War has changed its character fundamentally in the past five centuries, but throughout these changes of technique and incidence it has always been instigated by people with white hands and clean collars.

There are natural militarists no less than natural pacifists, and artificial militarists no less than artificial pacifists. The artificial militarist, however, the man forced to fight against his natural inclinations, corresponds to the natural pacifist; and the natural militarist has something in common with the emotional pacifist. Some of my readers may resent this distinction between the natural pacifist and the notional or emotional pacifist—the preaching pacifist, as we might call him, to distinguish him from the practicing pacifist. But pacifists should not be afraid to take a look at themselves, to try and realize by what motives, conscious or unconscious, their actions are inspired.

We hate war: that is a natural reaction, especially when we have had a taste of it. Nothing could be more

reasonable or natural than the attempt to prevent war, because it can now be demonstrated that no one has anything to gain by war. The most that can be said for war—I think it is the most that our most ardent militarists say—is that we have to submit to one evil in order to avoid another and worse evil. The evil effects of war, it is argued, can never equal the evil effects of a tyranny such as threatened the world in 1939.

Many pacifists—in 1939—accepted this argument. That merely proved the artificiality of their pacifism. They were ready, under the emotional circumstances of the time, to transfer their projected aggression from the general (militarism) to the particular (German or Nazi militarism). But once a pacifist particularizes about militarism, he is lost. He has lost the principle which should guide all his thoughts and actions, which is absolute respect for human life. Preventive wars, defensive wars—all wars are projections of the death instinct, and are therefore wars against life, against love. If peace is indivisible, so is war.

We are not secure in our pacifism unless our aggressive impulses are fully engaged elsewhere—in life-promoting activities, in life-protecting activities, or merely in mock-destructive activities like sport. It is not a *moral* equivalent for war that we need, but a *physical* equivalent, and it should, of course, be the aim of education and upbringing to give us just such an equivalent. The nature of that equivalent, however, needs elaboration.

The warrior of today has little in common with his Homeric prototype—I would say *nothing* in common. He is rarely active—he makes war in an underground office, and his instruments are the typewriter and the

test-tube—certainly not the sword. He fights with his intelligence or cunning rather than with any quality we can call valor or courage. He rarely risks his own life, and the only lives that are risked, apart from those of dumb inert civilians, are the lives of a certain number of pawns, moved to and from strategic positions like pins on a map—they have no personal will in the matter, and their only fate is to suffer passively. There may be fine moments in modern war—the Battle of Britain, Arnhem, the invasion of Normandy; but these moments become progressively less frequent, and in the atomic warfare of the future will not exist at all. What is still valuable in military service—and no one who has had experience of it would dismiss military service as wholly despicable—is a certain spirit which emerges from the corporate life of battalions, squadrons, destroyers, etc., rising to noble heights of self-sacrifice in situations of common danger. In short, it is the group consciousness of the Army or Navy or Air Force which endows modern warfare with any lingering trace of glory or vitality.

But this sense of community or group consciousness is not, of course, peculiar to the armed forces. We find it in the coal-pit or the merchant ship, in the co-operative farm or the college. We can dissociate it from war, and only regret that peace does not at present offer more opportunities for its emergence.

We may go further and say that, although this sense of community or brotherhood does at present find its most open expression during periods of war, in itself it is an expression of the life instinct, of the unitary power of love. It is a manifestation of the erotic impulse in the face of death.

Any equivalent for war, any projection of aggressive impulses in alternative directions, should if possible find a similar alliance with the love instinct, with the feeling of brotherhood. We get something of this spirit in sport—we call it "the team spirit"—but this is generally of very limited diffusion. The team spirit is too exclusive and, like patriotism, is too closely linked with aggressive instincts. The most striking characteristic of "esprit de corps" in the army is that it is never identified with any "esprit de guerre." It is not militant; on the contrary, it is profoundly pacifist, and even tends to express itself as sympathy for the common soldier on the other side. I know from personal experience that in the First World War one felt considerably more sympathy for the men on the other side of No Man's Land than for the civilians at home. I admit it is a little different now: there is no No Man's Land to separate us from our enemies. The death-grapple is closer, and the distinction between soldier and civilian is no longer so significant.

That difference can be expressed in another way: the war of the future will offer no opportunity for the expression of any sense of community. Aggression has been depersonalized—that is its subtlest evasion of responsibility. The release of aerial torpedoes, the dropping of atomic bombs—these simple actions—the pressing of a button, the pulling of a lever—give no direct satisfaction to the aggressive instincts. One hundred thousand human beings may, as a result, have been obliterated, but the button-pusher does not see the result; he can only gloat over the figures in a communiqué. In other words, modern war no longer satisfies the destructive impulse

which sets the machine in motion: it merely breeds an impotent rage in which all life and all wealth are thrown on flames which finally envelop the aggressor himself.

I draw these painful conclusions in order to give the right dimensions to the task of diversion, as we may call it. It is not a trickle or a stream which we have to turn into fresh channels, but a roaring flood, a broken dam. Wars have increased in their incidence, scope, and intensity with the evolution of civilization because that civilization, to an increasing extent, fails to provide natural outlets for the aggressive instincts: war is part of the price we pay for a mechanized system of production, for comfort and convenience and a higher standard of living. If we do not wish to sacrifice comfort and convenience and a high standard of living, we must devise counteractivities that fully engage the aggressive instincts which are our heritage—the resentful mental wounds which we all receive in the battle of life.

Such activities cannot be casual: they cannot safely consist of optional activities like sport or games or even local politics. Dr. Glover has discussed the various mechanisms which, in his opinion, might serve to discharge (or safely inhibit or counteract) existing states of primitive tension (they vary from the exploitation of what he calls "love systems" to the encouragement of mountaineering), but for a reason which I find wholly inadequate he dismisses what I regard as the essential method—namely, education. He excuses this neglect on the plea that "education is in essence an artificial expedient or experiment initiated by environment ostensibly to promote reality adaptation, but unconsciously to influence the mechanism of displacement in certain

directions." This seems to mean that education is at present a crude process of inhibition with incalculable consequences. But why not, then, seek to reform education instead of dismissing this vast and decisive social mechanism as "an artificial expedient."

Dr. Glover seems to have a very poor opinion of school education, whose emotional influence he regards as negligible. He has in mind, of course, the kind of school to which he went, and to which I went, and to which the vast majority of children are still sent. But why does not Dr. Glover suggest a reform of education? I think it can only be because he, as a psychologist, has a certain predilection for those phases of upbringing which are the province of the parent rather than the teacher. It may be that we cannot alter "by conscious means" the primary "death wishes" which according to the psychoanalyst are "the unconscious reaction to childish rivalry and frustration and which . . . do more to perpetuate war than any other peculiarity of human development." [8] But why assume, as does Dr. Glover in this passage, that education is necessarily a "conscious means"? The whole point of certain modern educational methods is to work through unconscious processes of growth and adaptation; and when Dr. Glover calls for the application of more rational codes to sexual problems from infancy onwards, in order to reduce emotional friction, he is himself suggesting means just as "conscious" as any used in progressive schools.

But Dr. Glover is not really consistent. After dismissing education in the first edition of his book, he now, in a new edition, says that he does not believe "that war will ever be abolished until we learn how to bring

up children in a more reasonable and understanding way than we do at present." He now thinks that "the sooner our child-specialists and headmasters" are "shocked into sky-fits," the better for our children; but except for a contemptuous reference to boarding schools, he gives no indication of any positive educational plan. He calls for "a Renaissance of Family Culture," but unless family culture implies a system of private tutors or governesses, I do not see how Dr. Glover can separate it from the culture of the school. Family and school must be integrated; and that, indeed, is one of the main contentions of the educational reformer.

The reform of education is what I have been leading up to all this time. I believe that nothing less than a complete recasting or reorientation of our educational system can promote peace, can save mankind from annihilating wars. But what is needed cannot be covered by the timid approaches of the average educational reformer. Reform means that you take existing elements and shuffle them into a more satisfactory pattern: you revise the curriculum, raise the school age, build new schools. But that is not what I mean: I mean a complete transformation of the methods and aims of education.

At present, everywhere in the civilized world, we educate to promote intelligence, to promote industry, to ensure progress. It is not merely a question of promoting what the psychoanalysts call "reality adaptation"; it is to the reality of a competitive and divided society that, by existing processes of education, we seek to adapt our children. The aggressive instincts have a wonderful opportunity to discharge themselves, but it is against other

children, in a ruthless struggle for places, for examination results, for class promotion. We educate to classify—that is to say, to divide—and all our efforts are expended in the cultivation of distinctions.

Let me suggest as fundamental aims of what education should be two determining principles, and then let us try and trace the consequence of accepting these principles. The first principle I would express as: Educate with reference to things. The second as: Educate to unite, not to divide.

By education with reference to things I mean rather more than is usually covered by the term "activist" education. Activist education is sometimes directed towards divisive ends: it can be just as competitive as textbook education. My two principles, therefore, should always be considered together. What a child can accomplish unaided in the control or manipulation of things is very limited; but he soon discovers, under wise guidance, that much more can be accomplished by co-operation and mutual aid.

Education with reference to things means no more than what Plato and Rousseau meant: that education should flow through the senses, the limbs and muscles, and not primarily through the faculty of abstraction. "Keep the child dependent on things only," said Rousseau.[4] "By this course of education you will have followed the order of nature. Let his unreasonable wishes meet with physical obstacles only [in our words, let his aggressive impulses work themselves out on physical obstacles only], or with the punishment which results from his own actions, lessons which will be recalled when the same circumstances occur again. It is sufficient

to prevent him from wrongdoing without forbidding him to do wrong. Experience or lack of power should take the place of law." And so on, all to illustrate Rousseau's maxim that true education consists less in precept than in practice.

Though Rousseau gave the right direction to educational theory in such a maxim, he was far from working out a system which has any relevance to our present problems. Plato, whom Rousseau regarded as the greatest of educators, is more to the point because he was a sounder moralist than Rousseau. Rousseau, typical Protestant that he was, found the moral law within. The love of others, he said, springs from self-love, and this is the source of human justice. But Plato found that source in the physical world, in concrete things which illustrate the harmony and divine proportion of the universe. He therefore based his system of education on the study of the arts which embody these laws—music, poetry and dancing, and, at a higher stage of education, mathematics. From this point of view Rousseau's formula—keep the child dependent on things—is not active enough, is not subtle enough. That dependence must be imitative—must be rhythmical, ritualistic, interpretative. In other words, education must be through arts, through gymnastics, through creative play of all kinds; it must be under the patronage of Dionysus rather than Apollo, and it must project, into physical celebrations, into dramatic fantasies, the aggressive impulses which are latent within us all. From this point of view the phenomenon of *catharsis*, the purgation of the emotions recognized by the Greeks as taking place in their drama, takes on a clearer significance: catharsis is precisely a discharge of

aggressive impulses, and particularly of the death instinct, through imaginative participation in tragic events.

We have reached the apparently paradoxical conclusion that play is the prophylactic of war. And that was Plato's conclusion, in his latest and wisest work, *The Laws*. We must spend our lives, he says, "in making our *play* as perfect as possible. . . . It is the current fancy [and it is a fancy *still* current] that our serious work should be done for the sake of our play; thus it is held that war is serious work which ought to be well discharged for the sake of peace. But the truth is that in war we do not find, and we shall never find, either any real play or any real education worth the name, and *these* are the things I count supremely serious for such creatures as ourselves. Hence it is peace in which each of us should spend most of his life and spend it best. What, then, is our right course? We should pass our lives in the playing of games, *certain* games, that is, sacrifice, song, and dance, with the result of ability to gain Heaven's grace, and to repel and vanquish an enemy when we have to fight him." (*Laws*, VII, 803)

But that final snag remains—"when we have to fight." If all peoples followed the advice of Plato, then we should all gain Heaven's grace, and there would be no fighting between us. To the indivisibility of peace must correspond an indivisibility of education, and even UNESCO's efforts to that end cannot succeed so long as the communist nations remain committed to the theory that war is serious work which ought to be well discharged for the sake of peace. What is our solution of that dilemma?

To those who are not pacifists we can say, with

Plato, that we shall not be worse off if we behave as Plato would have us behave. Plato was not a pacifist; on the contrary, he believed in conscription and in the same military training for boys and girls alike. But military training, in those days, consisted of archery and horsemanship, with a certain amount of field marching and company drill. I must confess that I see no harm in training of this kind. Military training as such is not a hardship in itself: it is the motives behind it, the moral turpitude and psychological perversity that lead to it, which make it an evil to be resisted with our utmost intelligence.

War, as Rousseau pointed out long before Tolstoy took up the theme, only makes manifest events already determined by moral causes (*Emile*, Bk. IV). For this reason our main energies must be directed against the moral causes of war. Those moral causes lie within ourselves—and pacifists should not suppose for a moment that they are pure in heart in this respect. The moral regeneration of mankind can be accomplished only by moral education, and until moral education is given priority over all other forms of education, I see no hope for the world. I have already indicated what I mean by moral education—*not* education by moral precept, but education by moral practice, which in effect means education by aesthetic discipline, and in the chapters that follow I shall try to describe in more detail the principles and methods of this kind of education.

III

EDUCATION IN THINGS

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I HAVE already quoted one of those aphorisms which keep a book like *Emile* forever vital: "Keep the child dependent on things only." I should now like to develop the implications of that formula, giving to it a meaning which Rousseau himself, perhaps, would not have wholly approved.

While engaged in making some notes for this chapter, I picked up a book which has just been published in England, and which had no apparent connection with our subject—it was the *Letters of Eric Gill.* Eric Gill was a friend of mine, and I owe much to the fierce challenges which he often threw at me in friendly conversation or public debate. I do not remember that we ever discussed the problem of education, but on opening the volume of his letters I found one addressed to his son-in-law which, without any reference to Rousseau, and, I suspect, without any knowledge of Rousseau's phrase, restates the problem in contemporary terms. It is rather a long text, perhaps, but it is too much to the point to reject or shorten. In schools as we know them, Gill wrote, "there is on one hand:

Book education—therefore thoughts, words, ideas, reading *about* it, writing *about* it, learning *about* it, and *exams* about it (*mental* discipline, *intellectual discipline*)

and on the other:

Games education—therefore actions, physical development, combative enthusiasm, loyalty development—the 'team spirit.' Personal prowess, pride in oneself—self-respect . . . (in fact, *moral* discipline, discipline of the *will*).

But on neither hand is there any education in *things!*

There is no *poetic experience.*

Intellect is trained almost entirely by books.

Will is trained almost entirely by games. . . .

But . . . we live in a world of *things.* Making things is a large part of man's life—*any* man's, and certainly the majority of men are *operatives* of one kind or another. And yet there is no education in things—no education in poetic experience. We grab an idea, a concept, an abstraction, a representation, i.e., we train our *intellects.* We grab balls and bats and one another's ankles, i.e., we train our wills. But we grab no *thing.* No thing *as such* and for itself, no *being*—only thoughts *about* things, only actions in *relation* to things. Poet, poiesis, *maker*—grasper of *things,* reality as knowable by *experience* of it. Art, artistry (from cats' meat to cathedrals) is all a matter of poetry, grasping reality, grasping things."

It is rather a repetitive text, perhaps, but the state of complacency, of complete blindness to facts which stare us in the face, is such that only the repeated blows of a chiseller's mallet, such as Gill used in his daily work, can

get them into our heads. There are a few simple but tremendously important truths about education which are ignored, not because we can dispose of them, deny them, but rather because the recognition of them would upset the whole scale of our *social* values—destroy, as we might say, our accepted pattern of behavior. Why we should cling so desperately, so irrationally, to social values or patterns of behavior which again and again have led us to war and unemployment and other miseries is more than our present science of psychology can explain. That science can only suggest a therapy, a cure for ills it cannot adequately diagnose—but it has gone so far as to admit that in the immediate circumstances of our lives the pursuit of any activities which engage the sensuous faculties in practical skills, and which lead to a deeper appreciation of beauty or grace, are obviously desirable as an antidote to the nervous and physical diseases of our almost wholly mechanized civilization. But surely we can agree that for this body of society of which we are all members, no less than for the body of the individual human being, prevention is better than cure. Nothing, from this point of view, is more degrading to the dignity and spiritual value of art than to regard it as merely a form of therapy, a medicine to be administered in doses only when the patient is sick. Art is rather an expression of health: it is exuberance, exhilaration, ecstasy. But again, it is not the expression of an exceptional state of health such as words like these might suggest: art is, or should be, the normal sensuous quality or virtue of all that we make or manufacture. Since when, we must ask, did art become a thing apart, an activity which we now associate only with leisure, or with recreation?

I am going to consider for a moment this word "leisure," for its common use is directly related to that gap in education pointed out by Gill.

"Leisure" is a word which has subtly and slowly changed its meaning during the course of the last hundred years. It used to mean no more than "time" or "opportunity." "If your leisure serv'd," says one of Shakespeare's characters, "I would speak with you." Phrases which we still use, such as "at your leisure," preserve this original meaning.

But when, as nowadays, we speak of the *problem* of leisure, we are not thinking of securing time or opportunity to do something: we have time on our hands, and the problem is how to fill it. Leisure no longer signifies a space with some difficulty secured against the pressure of events: rather it signifies a pervasive emptiness for which we must invent occupations. Leisure is a vacuum, a desperate state of vacancy—a vacancy of mind and body. It has been handed over to the sociologists and the psychologists: to such specialists it is more than a problem—it is a disease.

I can think of no change so symptomatic of our degeneracy, our civilized dis-ease, as this change in the meaning of "leisure." The habit of thought it represents is so deeply ingrained that I fear it is going to be difficult for me to make clear the possibility of a different attitude, of a different way of life.

The existence of most people is divided into two phases, as distinct as day and night. We call them *work* and *play*. We work for so many hours a day, and when we have allowed the necessary minimum for such activities as eating and shopping, the rest we spend in various

activities which we call *recreations*, an elegant word which indicates that we do not even play in our hours of leisure, but spend them in various forms of passive enjoyment which we call *entertainment*—not playing baseball, but watching baseball games; not drama, but theatre-going; not walking, but riding in an automobile.

We have, therefore, not only a hard-and-fast distinction between work and play, but an equally hard-and-fast distinction between active play and passive entertainment. It is, I suppose, the decline of active play—of amateur sport—and the enormous growth of purely receptive entertainment which has given rise to a sociological interest in the problem. If the greater part of the population, instead of indulging in healthy sports, spend their hours of leisure in dark and crowded cinemas, there will inevitably be a decline in health and physique. And in addition there will be a psychological problem, for we have yet to trace the mental and moral consequences of a prolonged diet of sentimental or sensational films. There is, if we are optimistic, the possibility that the diet is too thin and unnourishing to have much permanent effect on anybody. Nine films out of ten seem to leave absolutely no impress on the mind or imagination of those who see them: few people can give a coherent account of the film they saw the week before last, and at longer intervals they must rely on the management to see that they do not sit through the same film twice.

On the same level of passive entertainment are most of the programs provided by the radio and most of the reading provided by the book clubs and circulating libraries. I know that there are good things broadcast

almost every day, and not every novel is a sentimental best-seller. But I am not really concerned with the quality of passive entertainment; from my present point of view I see no great difference between the person who sits through a Deanna Durbin film and the person who sits in an armchair at home, knitting, and listens to a Beethoven symphony. The person who listens to the music may derive some advantage from her knitting, but the passive absorption of repeated doses of music, or of poetry or any other sensuous drug, does not seem to me to be necessarily a good thing. The arts were originally a communal celebration: they were created for people gathered together to dance, or sing, or worship. They gained as much from this communion as they gave: the form and the effect were enhanced by physical contagion, by common enjoyment.

I might as well confess at this point that I daily grow suspicious of what I can only call exhibitionist culture. Exhibitions of painting and sculpture, of French tapestries or Australasian totems; concerts of classical music, of modern music, of Chinese music; operas from Vienna or ballet from Russia—yes, it is all very entertaining, a little exhausting if we care to keep up with the accelerating pace of it all; and no doubt it does increase the curious collection of odd impressions, of disconnected facts and half-remembered names, which we keep in some corner of our cerebellum and call knowledge—and which we dig up from this cloudy and overcrowded receptacle when we want to display our "culture." But what does it all mean in the terms of the vital reality which is our daily behavior and immediate happiness? Very little that I can see.

We have to live art if we would be affected by art. We have to paint rather than look at paintings, to play instruments rather than go to concerts, to dance and sing and act ourselves, engaging all our senses in the ritual and discipline of the arts. Then something may begin to happen to us: to work upon our bodies and our souls.

That is my first point: entertainment must be active, participated in, practiced. It is then more properly called *play*, and as such it is a natural use of leisure. In that sense it stands in contrast to *work*, and is usually regarded as an activity which alternates with work. It is there that the final and most fundamental error enters into our conception of daily life.

Work itself is not a single concept. We say quite generally that we work in order to make a living: to earn, that is to say, sufficient tokens which we can exchange for food and shelter and all the other needs of our existence. But some of us work physically, tilling the land, minding the machines, digging the coal; others work mentally, keeping accounts, inventing machines, teaching and preaching, managing and governing. There does not seem to be any factor common to all these diverse occupations, except that they consume our time and leave us little leisure. But at different periods they have been differently regarded. Some work, such as mining, was once despised, and forced on slaves and prisoners of war. A miner is now a highly esteemed and relatively highly paid craftsman. Surgeons used to be on a level with barbers: theirs is now one of the most richly rewarded professions in the world. The social status of the actor has been completely transformed during the

past two centuries. But though the constituent elements may shift from one level to another, the hierarchy remains fairly constant. The professions occupy one level, the merchant adventurers another (we now call them by a less romantic title), and below these are the skilled craftsmen and still lower, at the bottom of the pyramid, the unskilled laborers.

We may next observe that one man's profession or work is often another man's recreation or play. The merchant at the week-end becomes a hunter (he has not yet taken to mining); the clerk becomes a gardener; the machine-tender becomes a breeder of bull terriers. There is, of course, a sound instinct behind such transformations. The body and mind are unconsciously seeking compensation—muscular co-ordinations, mental integration. But in many cases a dissociation is set up and the individual leads a double life—one half Jekyll, the other half Hyde. There is a profound moral behind that story of Stevenson's, for the compensation which a disintegrated personality may seek will often be of an antisocial nature. The Nazi party, for example, in its early days was largely recruited from the bored—not so much from the unemployed as from the street-corner society of listless hooligans.

Scientific studies have been made of street-corner society—the society out of which crime, gangsterdom and fascism inevitably develop. It is a society with leisure —that is to say, spare time—and without compensatory occupation. It does not need a Satan to find mischief for such idle hands to do—idle hands will spontaneously itch to do something: muscles have a life of their own unless they are trained to purposeful actions. Actions, or

rather *activities*, are the obvious reflex to leisure: they consume it, and leave the problem solved.

But work is also activity, and if we reach the conclusion that all our time must be filled with one activity or another, the distinction between work and play becomes rather meaningless, and what we mean by play is merely a change of occupation. We pass from one form of activity to another: one we call work, and for that we receive pay; the other we call play, and for that we receive no pay—on the contrary, we probably pay a subscription.

Let us now assume that the activity for which we are paid is an enjoyable one. Here we must be careful not to make false assumptions. There are many people who are "proud of their job," or in some sense satisfied with their position in the world, not because they find any enjoyment or satisfaction in the activity itself, but because it is well-paid, or ensures a position of prestige in society. I have met many people who are proud of their status, but they hate the sight of their office or place of work. Money and all it can buy, social privileges and a sense of superiority, give them a feeling of satisfaction or complacency which overwhelms the essential emptiness or boredom of their occupation.

These are not the people I have in mind. Let us rather consider a craftsman who takes an endless delight in his work—he may be a surgeon, he may be a poet; he may be a ploughman or a plasterer. The question we must then ask is: Where does his work end, or his play begin? Will that craftsman put down his tools, to go and stand blankly at a street corner? Will he stop his operation halfway, to smoke a cigarette, to play a game

of snooker? There is a fable related by Thoreau towards the end of *Walden* for a different purpose which will serve to illustrate my meaning here:

"There was an artist in the city of Kouroo who was disposed to strive after perfection. One day it came into his mind to make a staff. Having considered that in an imperfect work time is an ingredient, but into a perfect work time does not enter, he said to himself, it shall be perfect in all respects, though I should do nothing else in my life. He proceeded instantly to the forest for wood, being resolved that it should not be made of unsuitable material; and as he searched for and rejected stick after stick, his friends gradually deserted him, for they grew old in their works and died, but he grew not older by a moment. High singleness of purpose and resolution, and his elevated piety, endowed him, without his knowledge, with perennial youth. As he made no compromise with Time, Time kept out of his way, and only sighed at a distance because he could not overcome him. Before he had found a stock in all respects suitable the city of Kouroo was a hoary ruin, and he sat on one of its mounds to peel the stick. Before he had given it the proper shape the dynasty of the Candahars was at an end, and with the point of the stick he wrote the name of the last of that race in the sand, and then resumed his work. By the time he had smoothed and polished the staff Kalpa was no longer the pole-star; and ere he had put on the ferrule and the head adorned with precious stones, Brahma had awoke and slumbered many times. But why do I stay to mention these things? When the finishing stroke was put to his work, it suddenly expanded before the eyes of the astonished artist into the

fairest of all the creations of Brahma. He had made a new system in making a staff, a world with full and fair proportions; in which, though the old cities and dynasties had passed away, fairer and more glorious ones had taken their places. And now he saw by the heap of shavings still fresh at his feet, that, for him and his work, the former lapse of time had been an illusion, and that no more time had elapsed than is required for a single scintillation from the brain of Brahma to fall on and inflame the tinder of a mortal brain. The material was pure, and his art was pure; how could the result be other than wonderful?"

Compare the singleness of purpose which this fable illustrates with the divided purposes of our average life, and you will see the drift of my argument. Thoreau went into the woods to demonstrate that "to maintain one's self on this earth is not a hardship but a pastime, if we will live simply and wisely"; he succeeded in his task, but his experiment would have died with him, and been lost to the world, but for the paper mills and printing presses which imply a very different kind of life for the majority of people. The difficulty is not to maintain one's self, but a society in which the self can expand and find its fulfilment.

Thoreau tried to obtain his freedom by abolishing work; the real solution is to combine freedom and work, and this can be done only by transforming work into play, or play into work. The craftsman can do this because he can *lose* himself in his work, by which we mean that he can engage all his faculties in the execution of his work-mind, and muscle, vision, touch and judgment. The true craftsman has no leisure, but only rest and

freedom; he is a player who has put down his instrument, to enjoy the sense of freedom, to relax, to indulge the senses, to meditate, to worship, to pray, and finally to die in peace of mind.

The craftsman is an anomaly in our modern mechanized society: he is almost extinct. The problem, therefore, is to introduce the emotional satisfactions of a craftsman's work into the industrial system which is our heritage. It is a problem with almost endless extensions, so complex that many thinkers who have tried to solve it have despaired, and cried out in their despair for a reversal of history, for the abolition of the system of machine production and a return to the system of handicrafts. Ruskin, Tolstoy, Morris, Gandhi, Gill—all these great men, with impressive unanimity, have condemned our modern society, and found no solution other than a return to a peasant economy. They, too, would live simply and wisely, like Thoreau in his wood by Walden Pond.

There are two factors which make such a solution fantastically difficult. The machine has not left the world as it found it. It has created a vast army to serve it —the proletariat. In the British Isles alone the population doubled between 1830 and 1930—twenty million extra human beings came into existence, to serve the machines and to be fed and clothed by the machines. Accompanying this expansion of population, there was a progressive increase in the standard of living—I do not mean so much in the amount and quality of food, as in comforts and conveniences which we would never willingly surrender—swift communications, electric power, clean cities and discreet sanitation. It may be, as Eric Gill be-

lieved (and as Jean Giono believes) that these benefits have been purchased too dearly: that moral and physical health will never be restored to the world until the last tractor has rusted into the soil and the peasant once more goes to bed by candlelight, having spent the day carting his home-made compost to the hand-ploughed fields. But what about the millions of extra "hands" which now tend the machines? Emigration? But emigration is no solution unless you have a machine-civilization which alone makes it possible for mankind to develop the waste spaces of the world.

Apart from such considerations (and I admit the argument is not complete), there is something radically wrong in such defeatism. Civilizations can, of course, take a wrong turning, and its peoples find too late that catastrophe has overtaken them. It may be that we are on a steep incline which leads to such a disaster. But we cannot save ourselves by turning back. There is no single instance of a civilization in the past which turned back on its tracks and saved itself. But there are plenty of instances of "a failure of nerves"—of civilizations that have not dared to go forward, or even to stand firm. I do not suppose that there are any simple explanations of the decline of civilizations, but such causes as there are combine to exhibit a lack of faith in the future, of zest in the present.

We should attempt, therefore, to control the machine before we destroy it, or let it destroy us. Up to the present we have exercised very little social control on the machine. We have had our Factory Acts and workshop regulations; we now have some timid attempts at town planning and the planned location of industries.

But we have never ventured to say the machine shall go thus far and no farther; the machine shall do this, but not that; the machine shall be put here, but not there. The whole development of machine production has been sporadic and uncontrolled. It has proliferated: it has not been rationed.

I believe that the greatest evils that flow from machine production are evils of location and distribution. The centralization of industry was a consequence of the localization of power—on the river bank, near the colliery, near the railway. Electrification and the internal-combustion engine have almost completely destroyed the raison d'être of such centralization. The factory can now be located in the village, and, moreover, it can itself be split up and decentralized, component parts being made in half a dozen different localities and assembled in another. Henry Ford, who was no fool in such matters, came to the conclusion, towards the end of his life, that his great centralized factory at Detroit was a dinosaur—an obsolete monster. He began to advocate a widely spread network of village workshops. In such workshops workers would be healthier: they would have their gardens and even their farms, and live the balanced life of the medieval craftsman. Vitality would return to the villages: the antagonism of town and country, peasantry and proletariat, would disappear: a social unity, such as we have not known for centuries, would be re-established.

Such villages already exist—in countries like Switzerland and Sweden. I know one or two in my own county of Buckingham, in England, where the cottages are grouped round a church, a pub, and a chair factory. But there are obvious limits to such decentralization: the fac-

tories of Birmingham would need more villages than can be found in the county of Warwick, and instead of a relatively concentrated Black Country, we do not want one vast Grey Country.

The problem is more difficult in some parts of the United States, where the village, in any organic sense, has never existed. But the village is an expression of a given economic system, and if you change the system into one that requires the village, villages will soon spring up, even in Alabama.

I am convinced that decentralization is the physical prerequisite of any solution of what we call the problem of leisure. It is not the human soul in its freedom that craves for entertainment and the dissipation of boredom: it is that soul crowded into cities, cut off from the soil and the seasons, deprived of natural alternations of satisfying activities. The city is literally a complex, and from that complex arises a vast social neurosis of which this "problem of leisure" is but one of the symptoms.

It will need more than a physical reorientation of industry to cure that neurosis. There must also take place a psychical reorientation, a re-integration of the personality, a healing of the social consciousness. Something may be achieved in this direction by a distribution of ownership, or responsibility. We need the decentralization not only of industry itself, but also of the powers and responsibilities of industry. That kind of decentralization is as essential as physical decentralization, but obviously it would be dangerous if it merely led to the creation of a number of closed corporations, all brotherly love within, but all hatred and suspicion towards similar corporations in other industries. The sectarian persecu-

tions and conflicts which developed within the Christian church warn us that a common faith may be a source of division unless we have first the physical and psychological bases of mutual aid. Our greatest task is the building of such bases, and we can carry it through, in my opinion, only by a process of education, but a process of education which will bear little relation to what we now call education.

Present systems of education might be generally described as *partitive*. Their tendency is not to unite but to divide. They divide in the first place because they establish a hierarchy or caste system, not only splitting children into age groups—infant, primary, secondary, technical, commercial and university, but decreeing that certain tests should determine the right of an individual child to proceed beyond a particular stage. Within each group similar tests and examinations determine the place of the individual child within the group. All these tests and examinations have the effect of pitting child against child in a grim struggle for places, and the division of any local community of children into groups determined by these tests further accentuates the sense of social division, of disunity.

Naturally, the process of education has to be organized, and a certain amount of "herding" is the inevitable accompaniment of overcrowded schools and overworked teachers. But what I am stressing is that, altogether apart from such questions of organization, there exists a deliberate policy of grading by intelligence tests. The more democratic we try to make the process of education, the more drastic these partitive procedures become. In England, for example, there is a test at 11 plus

which determines whether a child shall proceed to a secondary education or not, and this is creating a social division just as decisive as any that formerly existed between rich and poor, bourgeois and proletariat, upper class and lower class. Formerly social differences were determined by inherited wealth, or blood; they are now determined by inherited intelligence and regulated by a national educational system. That, at least, is the ideal of the national educational systems, and it may be that if some form of social hierarchy is desirable, or inevitable, one based on intelligence tests is superior to one based on inherited wealth. But even when functioning perfectly, such a system would still be partitive, establishing divisions rather than creating unity. There is, perhaps, no likelihood of a social hierarchy based on intelligence ever coming into being. Class distinctions have never been rational distinctions—they have always been based on irrational instincts and prejudices. A social order based on intelligence tests would cut right across many deeply rooted customs and vested interests. This would be true even of a society like the United States of America, where a democratic ideology prevails, and where there is certainly no intention to educate for class differences. I base this bold assertion on a fairly recent book by three American authors. The title of the book is *Who Shall Be Educated? The Challenge of Unequal Opportunities*,[1] and the authors—two of them members of the Committee on Human Development, University of Chicago—after making a sociological survey of the schools in the United States, come to the conclusion that these schools, "functioning in a society with basic inequalities, facilitate the rise of a few from lower to higher levels, but

continue to serve the social system by keeping down many people who try for higher places. The teacher, the school administrator, the school board, as well as the students themselves, play their role to hold people in their places in our social structure. . . . The American school . . . reflects the socio-economic order in everything it does; in what it teaches, whom it teaches, who does the teaching, who does the hiring and the firing of the teachers, and what the children learn in and out of the classroom. . . . It is apparent that the high-school curriculum is a mechanism which helps perpetuate our class order."

Convincing evidence is brought forward to show that even in these democratic States of America, the educational system serves to preserve divisions rather than to promote unity.

Such social consequences of prevailing methods of education are not my main concern at the moment, but in so far as the unity of group consciousness is disrupted by education, to that extent it remains difficult to prevent the growth of social neurosis. But even supposing that the caste system which results from educational differentiation could be avoided, there still remains the fundamental educational problem: What kind of education will promote social union?

The answer is, of course, the same kind of education as that which promotes personal integrity. Education should always embrace the one and the many, the person and the group; and any phase of education which tends to emphasize the person against the group, or the group against the person, is obviously disruptive. Among these disruptive agencies I would place, not only the examination system and the systematic categories which are based

on it, but, in a still more general sense, the whole ideal of modern education.

That ideal, as I have already said, is intellectual. It tends to become even narrower than that: the ideal, in Great Britain and generally in Western Europe, Russia and the United States, is scientific. Even in subjects which used to be described as "liberal"—philosophy, literature and history—the spirit of teaching becomes increasingly "objective" or "positive," and all questions of "value" are rigidly excluded.

What is thus excluded, in education generally, is the whole province of moral values. I agree with Gill that to a limited extent a discipline of the will is given in games education. I do not deplore the time given to games in our schools—on the contrary, it is often the only time well spent. But the moral discipline thus inculcated is of very limited duration—it has no depth, it does not involve the imagination or the emotional life in any profound sense. Games morality, the team spirit, has become indeed just one more social convention—though to be "a good sport" generally means to behave like a human being rather than as a conventional citizen—in other words, to disregard "morality." But "morality," in the sense of a code of right and wrong, has to be distinguished from the moral values of good and evil. Morality itself has been intellectualized, codified, and made a matter of rational judgment instead of spontaneous action. Moral education in the ancient world, when Plato and Aristotle handled the theme, meant the learning of something like good manners or good form, good doing and good making; it was a dynamic concept, a concept of nobility, of wisdom, of courage. The object of moral education was

expressed in the one word *virtue*. Education, according to Plato, should never be conceived with any narrow vocational purpose. Education is rather "that schooling from boyhood in goodness which inspires the recipient with passionate and ardent desire to become a perfect citizen" (*Laws*, 643). Any other kind of education he regarded as vulgar and illiberal.

Social union, social discipline, social morale—whatever we like to call that sense of belonging to one another, of living in perfect brotherhood—that is or should be the aim of education. I don't pretend to know what precise steps we should take, here and now, to secure that kind of aim in education; but I am quite sure that our existing systems of education lead right away from social union, dissolve the subtle bonds of love and fellowship, and leave us a nerve-ridden aggressive herd.

Here and there we find experiments which point the way. In England there is now a fairly widely diffused awareness of the problem among educationists. As yet practical reforms have become effective only in a few sporadic instances, but there is a very active society for Education in Art with about one thousand members, most of them teachers of art. Their enthusiasm is spreading the gospel throughout the country. Against them is not only the existing system of education with all its ramifications, all its vested interests and traditional practices, but also the social system itself with its professional codes, its standards of rectitude and knowledge.

Outside the educational sphere there are other significant movements. The Peckham Health Centre is an experiment which has demonstrated in a remarkable way the *physical* regeneration which follows on the achieve-

ment of a group consciousness. There are many more experiments of an educational or psychological character being carried out in various parts of the world, only they lack co-ordination, they lack a common philosophy and aim. But there is among them a fairly conscious realization that the key to individual happiness and social unity is a certain kind of education. It is not sufficient to define it as "education for citizenship," without first revising our concepts, both of education and of citizenship. I think it forces the issue into its true light to define it as "education for virtue," or moral education, for such words come as something of a shock to educators who think and act almost unconsciously within the presuppositions of scientific materialism. If, with Rousseau or Eric Gill, we prefer to look at the means rather than the end, we can call it education in *things*, education in poetic experience, in practical activities. But I should say that such education is all part of the play way, of games education. "We should pass our lives," said Plato, "in the playing of games"; and by games he meant, as I have said on an earlier page, not only activities like baseball and cricket, but ritual, song and dance, all the activities we call art.

We shall re-define virtue and morality as we go along. Concepts like valor, purity, justice and wisdom, which were the typical virtues in Plato's world, may need re-definition in our world. But once we are in possession of them, once we are united in the exercise of such virtues, then I think it will be found that we have recovered that lost quality in living which I called *zest*. We shall so reform our industrial structure, the conditions of labor and production, that our daily work will

once more be zestful, and the division which exists between work and play will largely disappear. And with its disappearance we shall have solved the problem of leisure. For there is no leisure problem in a healthy society: it is merely the time we reserve for rest, or meditation, or recreation, in a life which is otherwise fully occupied with creative activities, by which I mean simply making things, doing things. When what we do is "the exercise of human skill and imagination in *every* department of human work," [2] then the distinctions between work and play, between art and industry, between vocation and recreation, between games and poetry—all these false distinctions disappear. Man becomes a whole man, and his way of life a continual celebration of his strength and imagination.

IV

CULTURE AND EDUCATION IN A WORLD ORDER

IV

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WRITING to Nietzsche sixty years ago, the Danish critic Georg Brandes rejected the title "an apostle of culture," which Nietzsche had wished to confer on him. "All apostolic mission-work has become to me an abomination," he said; "I am acquainted with only moralising missionaries, and I am afraid that I am not altogether orthodox in my belief as to what is understood by culture. Is there anything at all inspiring in our culture taken as a whole, and who can conceive of an apostle without inspiration?"

To this Nietzsche replied: "You should not repudiate the expression 'apostle of culture.' In these days one cannot be more of an apostle of culture than by making a mission of his unbelief in culture."

I must begin by warning the reader that I set out from this same point of view. Naturally I speak as a European, and it is possible that my point of view is not only limited, but even enveloped in a spectacular twilight. In 1887 culture in Europe was an established order, a monumental structure of prosperous cities and peaceful universities, of respected scholars and popular poets,

of universal exhibitions and expanding knowledge. . . . Tasteless and stupid as it might be, exasperating to geniuses like Nietzsche, Brandes and Burckhardt, yet it did exist—solid, self-satisfied, and apparently everlasting.

When we survey the intellectual life of Europe today, the contrast is overwhelming. Great cities are in ruins and scholars are scattered; the very instruments of culture, libraries, printing presses, paper-factories, have been destroyed or lack means to carry on. In the past such material difficulties have often constituted a challenge which, to adopt Toynbee's formula, has provoked a cultural response. But nowhere in Europe today can we find convincing evidence either of a vital movement of ideas or of an affirmative attitude in the arts. Europe is materially bankrupt and mentally exhausted. We cannot escape the conclusion that the epoch which began with the Renaissance, and which, in spite of interruptions and sudden checks, has formed a coherent tradition for more than five centuries, is now at an end. It is not a question of violent destruction, or of political disruption. These are the visible consequences of two world wars within a period of thirty years. Invisibly an inner disease, a canker, as we call it, has been eating away the sources of our European vitality, and any realistic diagnosis must recognize that the cure is not one which can be adequately defined by words like "planning" and "reconstruction." A new source of vitality, springing up within the body itself, must be discovered and released. It is not now a question of making a mission of one's unbelief in culture: culture in that sense is dead or dying, and what we must now consider is the possible germination of a new culture.

The notion of a doomed civilization has been current

for some time, and a form of historicism which gives to civilization an organic life-cycle has been characteristic of our age. The most pessimistic of these philosophers of history, Oswald Spengler, offers us no hope, no remission of our doom. Arnold Toynbee, the English philosopher of history already mentioned, is not so pessimistic—he admits that an upward tilt in the declining graph of civilization may be possible if we can become sufficiently conscious of our plight and take appropriate action to avoid the downward drift. A similar attitude is taken up by the Swiss psychologist, C. G. Jung, and his diagnosis is all the more valuable in that he indicates certain methods of cure. I might mention other analyses and prescriptions of equal profundity—those of Alfred Weber and Karl Jaspers, for example—but they all agree in this: the only hope of saving our civilization lies in the spiritual or psychological sphere: civilization, that is to say, is dependent on culture: unless as a people we find a new vision, we shall perish.

Into this world situation, universally recognized as desperate, there has stepped an official body called the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization—UNESCO for short—one of the specialized agencies provided for in the Charter of the United Nations. Its first general conference was held in Paris in November, 1946, and its constitution was then ratified. It has established its secretariat in Paris and is now building up an organization of considerable size and of almost unlimited scope.

UNESCO has been created as an immediate consequence of the war, and it is obvious from its printed Constitution that the prevention of future wars is regarded as

its primary task. That Constitution opens with these words:

"The Governments of the States parties to this Constitution on behalf of their Peoples declare: that since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed";

and it goes on to assert that:

"ignorance of each other's ways and lives has been a common cause, throughout the history of mankind, of that suspicion and distrust between the peoples of the world through which their differences have all too often broken into war."

The Constitution of UNESCO then announces the measures it will take to promote the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind. They include:

"full and equal opportunities for education for all;
"the unrestricted pursuit of objective truth;
"the free exchange of ideas and knowledge;
"the development and increase in means of communication";

or, more specifically:

"the free flow of ideas by word and image through all means of mass communication;
"the giving of a fresh impulse to popular education and the spread of culture;
"the suggesting of educational methods best suited to prepare children for the responsibilities of freedom;
"the maintenance, increase and diffusion of knowledge, by assuring the conservation and protection of the world's inheritance of books, works of art and monuments of history and science; international exchange of persons active in the fields of education, science and culture; exchange of publications, objects of artistic and scientific interest and other mate-

rials of information; international co-operation calculated to give the people of all countries access to the printed and published materials produced by any of them."

Before examining these purposes and functions in more detail, I would like to point out that they are based on two unconscious assumptions: that culture is a concrete material which can be disposed of, handed round, bartered like butter or steel; and secondly, that this material culture is already stored up in universities, libraries and museums, waiting, like corn in Egypt, to be distributed to the hungry masses. Whereas, in reality, culture is a spiritual growth, for the most part very lowly, like the grass in the fields, but growing here and there into tall fruitful trees, rooted nevertheless in the soil; and culture, being this indigenous and perishable organic life, can be uprooted and diffused only by artificial means and in a state of artificial preservation. To continue the metaphor, and to give the substance of what I am going to maintain, it is only the seeds of culture that can be diffused with any pervasive or creative result.

Before going on to lay bare my own assumptions, I will now venture to characterize the ideals which have presided at the creation of UNESCO [1] a little more precisely. UNESCO is a reincarnation of the Institute for Intellectual Co-operation and the International Bureau of Education, bodies which functioned before the war under the aegis of the League of Nations. The deliberations of these bodies were conducted on a plane of intellectual abstraction—they were international debating societies with absolutely no effect on the course of events. It is true that they carried out some useful technical research —on the cleaning of paintings or the architecture of

museums, for example—but their deliberations did not reach the common man, and their effect on the cultural situation in Europe was *nil.* It is too early yet to charge UNESCO with the same intellectual bias and seclusion; but the program it has announced already betrays an academic character; its policy so far shows the same reliance on conferences and committees; and in general there is the same tendency to confuse culture with learning, and education with propaganda. It has already been announced that one of the main campaigns of UNESCO will be directed against illiteracy. Here we see the prejudice of the scientific humanist, and scientific humanism is undoubtedly the intellectual atmosphere in which UNESCO has been conceived and is now being directed. Now, to the scientific humanist it is axiomatic that knowledge, in the sense of knowledge about the structure of the universe, about the facts of life, about history, geography and economics—that such knowledge constitutes the basis of human progress and that it should therefore be as widely diffused as possible. If every inhabitant of the globe could be taught to read and write, and if UNESCO could provide them with what are called "objective textbooks of history," then the problem of the solidarity of mankind would seem, to the scientific humanist, to be largely solved.

The fallacy which underlies this type of reasoning is a heritage of our cultural development since the Renaissance, and is due to the separation which then took place between intellectual and moral education. The ancient Greek philosophers, particularly Plato and Aristotle, had always insisted that the minds and the emotions of children should be trained *pari passu,* in equal measure, step

by step; and that if there was any question of priority, then the education of the emotions, moral or ethical education, should come first. The ideal put forward by UNESCO—"the unrestricted pursuit of objective truth" —would have been regarded by them as an extremely dangerous ideal. Objective truth, they would have said, must never be separated from subjective truth. Indeed, its scope should never exceed the limits set by subjective truth. The limits set by subjective truth are moral limits —limits, that is to say, determined by our sense of the good life, by our sense of a measure or harmony in the emotional and practical aspects of living.

What has happened since the Middle Ages is a gradual separation of these educational spheres. Owing to the identification of morality and religion—an identification which is an historical development, and has nothing to do with the essential nature of these two categories—the Christian church established its claim to control the moral education of children. This was satisfactory so long as the church also controlled the intellectual education of children. Within the Christian *Weltanschauung*, a development of the whole man was possible. But in the course of time, with the growth of scientific humanism and secularism, the church relinquished its control over intellectual education, retaining only the sphere of moral education.

The situation was bad enough when these two systems of education proceeded efficiently but independently—in the 17th and 18th centuries, for example. You then had two opposed but equally strong forces competing for the control of society—a Bossuet or a Fénelon gradually yielding to Voltaire, Rousseau and the Encyc-

lopaedists. During the 19th century, and at an increasing pace during our own century, the Christian church lost its authority within the States of Europe, and as a consequence it relinquished its essential function in society, the moral education of children. For all practical purposes moral education, in all but a few isolated communities, has entirely disappeared from our modern civilization.

The natural assumption is that, in order to restore moral education, we must re-establish the educational authority of the churches. But that is to forget that there is no essential connection between moral education, as defined by pagan philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, and religious belief as required by the Christian church. In other words, it is logically conceivable, and in my opinion practically possible, to re-establish moral education without waiting for a religious revival. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that a religious revival, if that is our desire, is not conceivable until there has been a moral re-education of mankind. Ecstatic conversions, blind emotional drives such as we associate with names like Billy Sunday or Aimée MacPherson, do not lead to the establishment of true religion, which always requires, according to its profoundest theologians, the grounding of faith in reason; nor do religious revivals of a sectarian character necessarily promote social unity.

But it is morality itself, as a concept, which must first be revised. It has become hopelessly entangled with religious emotion, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, with a purely rationalistic or legalistic codification of right and wrong. But morality is neither a mystery nor a judgment. It is the exercise of a free choice. It is a spontaneous act of volition, and the only problem, as Plato

realized, and as later educationists like Pestalozzi and Herbart realized, is how to ensure that the will always jumps instinctively, so to speak, in the right direction.

It may be objected that I am not using the word "morality" in its accepted sense, and I must admit I would be happier with some other word if it existed. It is an ironic fact that in English-speaking countries when we wish to describe that social integrity which I conceive to be the proper meaning of morality, we use the word in its French form—we speak of the *morale* of a people. But a people with *morale*—that is to say, with a unity arising spontaneously out of its social activities with mutual aid as its inspiring purpose—such a people possesses in the surest sense the elements of morality, and these elements are all the stronger for not being consciously formulated.

The basis of morality is not in faith nor in reason, but in a particular kind of discipline. Discipline is no mystery: it is a mechanism. The scientists call it a conditioned reflex. But everything, of course, depends on what our reflexes are conditioned to. Pavlov conditioned his dogs to respond to the ringing of a bell. By various experiments of that kind he could produce in animals, not merely a measurable flow of saliva, but complex emotional states corresponding to psychopathic symptoms in human beings. Human children can be conditioned even more easily than dogs, and because of their wide range of sensibility and intelligence, with infinitely subtler results. Modern psychologists, not to mention modern propagandists, recognize the perfect feasibility of conditioning the human mind, especially the still plastic mind of the child, to predetermined patterns of thought and be-

havior. The crucial question is the choice of the patterns. They can be arbitrary and ideological—the patterns imposed by the Jesuit, the Communist or the Nazi; but they can also be physical, when, if they are good patterns, we call them beautiful. The prototypes for such physical patterns are found in the objective world, in nature, in the formal structure of organic and inorganic phenomena. It was to the imitation of these prototypes that Plato first directed our attention. To come straight to the point, these prototypes are the patterns of virtue, to which all children should be conditioned. The whole burden of Plato's theory of education is to the effect that if only we bring up children in the contemplation of universal forms, in the practice of graceful and harmonious movements, in the active making of beautiful objects, then these children will instinctively recognize and choose goodness when they see it. Aesthetic education develops ethical virtue.

It is not my purpose, in this book, to give a detailed exposition of this theory of moral education. I am repeating certain ideas which are very clearly expressed by Plato. I can only beg the reader to return to the study of Plato if he feels any doubt, either about the priority of moral education or about the causal relationship which exists between moral virtue and aesthetic training. I have tried in a former book [2] to give these principles of aesthetic education a modern formulation; my purpose on this occasion is to bring into clear opposition two ideals and two implied policies—on the one hand that which UNESCO announces as "the unrestricted pursuit of objective truth," and, on the other hand, that which I will call "the primacy of morale discipline."

At this point it might be objected that UNESCO does recognize the need for a moral policy, in declaring that "the defences of peace must be constructed . . . in the minds of men," and again in speaking of the need to establish the "democratic principles of the dignity, equality and mutual respect of men," principles which are surely of a moral nature. But UNESCO, it will then be said, cannot intervene in matters which are so full of prejudice and irrationality as the moral discipline of nations. "The unrestricted pursuit of objective truth" is one thing —that is the famous objectivity of science, a logical positivism to which all nations, races and creeds must, if committed to the ideals of scientific humanism, give their assent. But a moral integrity of universal scope—a social unanimity in which white man and black man, Chinese and Eskimos, capitalists and communists, Christians and Buddhists, rationalists and mystics freely participate—that is not a project within the scope of UNESCO!

But nevertheless it is the only project that can secure the aims set forth by such an organization. If "wars begin in the minds of men," they are not to be prevented by card-indexes and encyclopaedias, by documentary films and the circulation of books on the subject. The minds of men are controlled only by some form of moral discipline. The question, therefore, is whether UNESCO, or any similar organization, can discover an effective method of securing the instinctive observance of certain moral disciplines. It is, to use our slang expression, "a tall order," but it has been attempted before. I have already referred to the methods of education proposed by Plato and Aristotle, which they would have considered of universal application. I might now refer to those moral

disciplines which have been the practical aspect of religions with a universal claim such as Buddhism, Christianity and Mohammedism. It is, of course, before the still powerful and conflicting claims of such religions that UNESCO hesitates to assert its authority. Even if eventually it has behind it the sanction of the United Nations and the atomic bomb itself, it will hardly venture to assert its authority against an arbitrary interpretation of the voice of God. The unrestricted pursuit of objective truth at this point comes into conflict with that other aim announced by UNESCO—universal respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the peoples of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion.

We might, of course, attempt to discover a common ground of morality in the eleven religious systems which prevail in the world today, but the result would be an unpersuasive abstract of dogmas. And it would ignore the truth demonstrated by every great educator, that men are not governed by moral precepts: they are made moral by habitual practices. It may be that some realization of the moral dilemma which would face an organization committed to the principle of scientific humanism influenced the communist members of the United Nations in their decision not to participate in UNESCO—the USSR and Jugoslavia have withheld their support from the organization. These nations have a very positive Weltanschauung of their own: they believe in a materialistic interpretation of history, and they cannot subscribe, therefore, to the very first principle announced in the Constitution of UNESCO—that wars have their origins in the minds of men. According to the doctrinaire Marxist,

wars have their origins in the economics of capitalist imperialism—in a sphere, that is to say, far more concrete than any covered by the phrase "the minds of men." I do not myself subscribe to this Marxist doctrine: it seems to me to be a simplification just as misleading as the intellectual explanation offered by the framers of UNESCO's Constitution. Modern wars have their origins in the collective unconscious of mankind if in any specific region; they are symptoms of the moral nihilism which has overtaken the civilized world, and they can only be prevented by a revolution in the social basis of human consciousness.

This moral revolution cannot be secured by intellectual propaganda addressed to minds already corrupted beyond redemption. A moral revolution is a total reorientation of the human personality, and can be secured only by two methods, which might be called (1) integration, and (2) education.

But *education*, it will be said, is the primary object of UNESCO: it has first place in its title and strongest emphasis in its objectives. But what I mean by education and what UNESCO means by education, are two entirely different things—the difference, in short, between *moral* and *intellectual* education.

Further, the methods of moral education which I propose are not the methods usually advocated by ethical and religious organizations. Like these organizations, I recognize certain moral values—justice, charity, freedom —but I do not believe that these values can be realized or preserved by the methods adopted by the churches. You can formulate moral precepts, tables of law, commandments, and these can be enforced by threats of punishment and eternal damnation. In this way instincts that

are socially inconvenient are driven underground where they fester until they become destructive forces, erupting like volcanoes with disastrous effects on the individual and on society. Nothing has been so clearly demonstrated by modern psychology as the reciprocal relationship between frustration and aggression, both in the individual and in society.

What is necessary, for our personal and social health, is some method of guiding the instinctive energies of man into positive, creative channels, so that no feelings of frustration ensue. That method is known to some psychologists as "sublimation," to others as "the integration of the personality," and such sublimation or integration should be a normal phase of education—a natural process which every person undergoes without strain or compulsion. When, as in the case of the vast majority of adults in our diseased societies, that natural process of integration has never been achieved—has never, indeed, been attempted—then some form of analysis and some method of therapy become necessary. We have to call in the physician.

Let us ignore for the moment the desperate position of those who are already afflicted with psychic disorders, and ask what form education should take if we would avoid those disorders in the future.

When Plato and Aristotle insist on the priority of moral education, these philosophers are assuming that knowledge and power, all the attributes of science and learning, are not merely ineffective, but positively dangerous, unless they are used to promote the well-being of mankind. It is surely not necessary to demonstrate that axiom to a world cowering under the threat of the atom

bomb! But in our present state of moral indecision, or moral *atrophy* as it should be called, no universal (i.e., politically effective) recognition is given to any moral values; or such recognition as is given is of a purely intellectual character, and has no emotional sanction. We recognize evil when it is objective—that is to say, when its social consequences are evident to our senses; but there is no compulsion to pursue good; good deeds are private deeds and are supposed to be their own rewards. We might say that our civilization has no natural habits of goodness—only certain intellectual concepts of goodness, some of which we try to enforce by legal sanctions.

Now, admittedly there are many decent people in the world today who aspire to the good life and conduct themselves in a manner which they would regard as sober, industrious and reasonable. But such people—our bourgeois selves—are the fellow passengers of our nihilistic decadence. We shrink from the violent extremes of fascism and totalitarianism, but that does not exempt us from seeking a solution of the problems which brought fascism and totalitarianism into being. In the state of our civilization today, moral passivity, even in the disguised shape of intellectual indifference, is no state of virtue. There were millions of good respectable citizens in Germany, and we can now see clearly that their inactivity was perhaps the greatest crime of all—certainly the decisive factor in a fateful situation.

It was not sufficient to stand aside in Pharisaic superiority. We are all implicated in the decadence of our civilization, and it is only to the extent that our dull indifference is fused to a white heat of moral indignation,

and consequent moral activity, that the future can have any promise of greatness.

Positive virtue is active virtue, and active virtue reveals itself in a certain way of life, a natural happiness or playfulness which has almost disappeared from the world today. We may find the pattern of such a civilization in some remote corner of the globe—perhaps in the island of Bali, in some Mexican village, or in an Eskimo's igloo—not in the so-called civilized world, not in Europe. We might do worse than go to the Balinese or the Eskimos for a lesson in the art of living, for there we should find preserved the two essential secrets of moral education—intimacy and activity. For we cannot expect to create a moral consciousness by means of what UNESCO calls "mass media"—the radio, the press and the cinema. Nor can we create a moral influence by words if we confine words to their intellectual usage. The essential means are, as Plato argued, aesthetic activities: the sense of goodness and nobility is inculcated, ingrained in the living substance of the human being, by the practice of concrete arts, which alone have that basis of harmony and rhythm found in nature. Such harmonious forms and relationships are qualities or essences which we can disengage from the material universe. Some of their dimensions or operations may be available only to intuition or special forms of consciousness (the sense of absolute pitch in music, for example); others can be measured and recorded by the scientist—the periodic arrangement of the elements, the harmonic structure of crystals, the formal relationships evolved in the growth of living organisms. But creative freedom within that world of harmony—that is an individual achievement, the product of

long exercise in aesthetic disciplines—poetry, dance, drama, the plastic arts. These disciplines should begin at the earliest age—in the nursery and the kindergarten—and should be the basic disciplines underlying every sphere of knowledge and education.

This, which is the substance of Plato's educational theory, was not advocated by Plato with the idea of creating more poets and artists—as we know, he did not believe in professional poets and banished them from his ideal republic. His aim was to create integrated personalities, human beings capable of good living—good citizens of the Republic. The same theory was revived by Schiller, but it was not taken seriously: it certainly found no place in the development of the German educational system, though Herbart had some premonition of it. It had a place, however, in the romantic tradition, and it was a German, Friedrich Nietzsche, who more definitely than any other modern philosopher, entered into the spirit of this essentially Hellenic conception of the moral value of aesthetic discipline.[8]

We cannot imagine UNESCO, or any national or international organization, committing itself to a programme which would involve—let me be quite clear about it—the reform of all existing academic institutions, a complete break-away from a pedagogic tradition which had its origins in the Revival of Learning. Universities, academies, colleges, polytechnics, laboratories, institutes and gymnasia—even our day-schools and kindergartens—represent vested interests of great antiquity and power. It would be easier to disband the armies and navies of the world than the forces which administer our educational systems. They must be left to die a natural death. The

new institutions, the new methods of education, the inspired pedagogues who must precede a new civilization, will spring up piecemeal, in isolated and unexpected places. As a matter of fact it is in the Soviet Union, the country which has officially adopted a philosophy of dialectical materialism, that the most significant educational experiment of our time has taken place—I refer to the system of education developed by Makarenko in the colonies he organized for the "bisprizornie" or vagabond children after the Revolution. Makarenko's methods were not specifically aesthetic, but he recognized that discipline was the end and not the means of education—its function not to regulate behavior to a dead convention but to create a living social organism, a happy co-operative community. Discipline in this sense is but another word for *style*, and it was this imponderable quality which, in the land of dialectical materialism, emerged as the most necessary educative ideal: a style of living.

In general, the forms of action which alone are effective are personal, cellular, local, I would like to say *molecular*. In this connection I would bring to my support some words of Pestalozzi's which Jung once quoted: "None of the institutions, measures, or means of education established for the masses and the need of men in the aggregate, whatever shape or form they may take, serve to advance human culture. In the vast majority of cases they are completely worthless for that purpose or directly opposed to it. Our race develops its human qualities in essence only from face to face, from heart to heart. It can do this only in small circles which gradually grow larger in the warmth of feeling and love, and in trust and confidence. All the means requisite for the education of

man, to make him humane, to make him truly a man, are the concern of the individual and of such institutions as are closely and intimately attached to his heart and mind. They never have been, or never will be, the concern of civilization." [4]

There is a further sentence or two of Pestalozzi's which bring together the two strands of my argument: "The human race cannot maintain its social unity without some force which creates order. Law and art are forces of culture which unite men as individuals in independence and freedom. The forces at work in a cultureless civilization join men together in masses by the power of force alone, without taking into account independence, freedom, law, and art."

Independence, freedom, law and art—these are all implicit in aesthetic education, and it is only in so far as we oppose aesthetic education to scientific education, and to intellectual education in the tradition of the Renaissance, oppose it as a complete and adequate substitute for these bankrupt traditions, that any hope can be entertained for the future of our European culture. The renewal must be a moral renewal, springing up in the private life and family circles of humble people; it must be a product of their earliest education and a constant habit of their upbringing. The only habit that is ennobling, penetrating to the frame and physique as well as the soul of man, is the creative activity in all its rituals, exercises, festivities and practical services. What men do makes them what they are; *how* they do what they do determines the quality of what they are; and it is only when the doing is raised to the dignity of a regular or ritualistic art that it penetrates into the deepest recesses of the soul.

I hope I have not carried my argument on to a metaphysical plane which is outside the range of common discourse, but in any case I will end by being as concrete and specific as the subject allows. My argument is that any process of cultural revival or reconstruction must operate through the individual. "*Alles, was anfaengt, faengt stets im Kleinen an.*" I take up the same position as Jung—"one goal is within our reach, and that is to develop and bring to maturity individual personalities." And just as Jung considers that the highest task of psychotherapy today is "to pursue with singleness of purpose the goal of the development of the individual," so I too consider that the person is the only ground in which a cultural renaissance can take place. "Renaissance," of course, is not a word we should use—it suggests a man awakening with a classical hang-over. It is not a question of the rebirth of a tradition that has died: we are called upon to create a new tradition; not, perhaps, a transvaluation of all values, in Nietzsche's sense, but at least, in Nietzsche's sense, a forward-looking culture, a Dionysian instead of an Apollonian attitude to life.

The rebirth of a tragic sense of life; the re-emergence of transcendental forces so long frustrated by the lawless expansion of competitive instincts, by crude materialism or by the elimination of human sympathy from the processes of thought; the restoration to life of significant play and ritual; a moral healthiness which is affirmative, and not an inhibition of all vitality; a sense of personal freedom and a consequent responsibility for the endowment of one's own fate with values; all these changes are involved as groundwork for a new civilization. But it is unlikely that these deep, subtle and intimate

changes can be brought about by secretariats and committees, by international conferences and polyglot organizations. They will be born in solitude, in meditation; in the family circle and in the nursery school; in the field and in the factory; in the face of specific problems and by conscious discipline; in creative community and in communal creations; in drama and in the building of new cities; in dance and song; in moments of mutual understanding and love. For all these moments and occasions, all that we need ask is peace in our time and an end to the exploitation of man by man.

But (and this is the bitter truth we must accept) these intimate occasions are not created within an artificial hegemony of nations. They are not a necessary consequence of the unity of nations: a unity of nations can only be a consequence of them. So we must begin with small things, in diverse ways, helping one another, discovering one's own peace of mind, waiting for the understanding that flashes from one peaceful mind to another. In that way the separate cells will take shape, will be joined to one another, will manifest new forms of social organization and new types of art. From that multiplicity and diversity, that dynamic interplay and emulation, a new culture may arise, and mankind be united as never before in the consciousness of a common destiny.

V

THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF AESTHETIC EDUCATION

The most fruitful because the most neglected starting point of philosophic thought is that section of value theory which we term aesthetic.

A. N. WHITEHEAD.

V

THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF AESTHETIC EDUCATION

"THE whole work of education and its *only* work may be summed up in the concept—morality." Such is the opening sentence of one of the decisive documents of the science of education: Johann Friederich Herbart's essay "On the Aesthetic Revelation of the World as the Chief Work of Education." This essay, published in the year 1804 as an appendix to an exposition of Pestalozzi's methods of education, may be regarded as Herbart's first and profoundest attempt to give a scientific basis to the more empirical intuitions of the great Swiss teacher.

Everything, in Herbart's dogmatic statement, depends on the meaning we are to give to the word *morality*. Subject to an agreement on such a definition, I am going to assume that we can accept the view that morality is the whole and only aim of education. I fully realize that such an assumption, in the contemporary world, would not be universally accepted. To Plato, to Kant, to Ruskin, the moral education of the citizen is the basis of their social philosophy; but there is little trace of such a philosophy in modern political programs. Morality is nowadays an uncomfortable concept, and is not the delib-

erate aim of any of the systems of education prevailing among the leading nations of the world today. Those systems are more concerned with what is known as vocational training, and if it is sometimes admitted that "citizenship," for example, is also a vocation, this is taught rather as a blind obedience to an established authority than as any exercise involving the free will.

But let us, with the aid of Herbart and other unfashionable philosophers, proceed to make some definitions.

The will to be good and to do good—that is the simplest definition of what the world has always meant by morality. But even this simple definition needs a gloss, for unless we emphasize the word *will*, and insist on its presence as an active principle in the person, we fail both to understand the essential nature of morality and to distinguish it from a false conception of morality which all too easily takes its place.

There is in morality an inherent tendency to legalism. What we discover to be good and agree to be good, we like to formulate in rules and regulations, in precepts and commandments; and once this is done, once the Tables of the Law are engraved, then obedience is exacted. But then obedience is no longer moral. It may be submission based on fear, or a habit of conformity, or at best an intellectual assent to a rational code. But it is no longer what Herbart called a "taking place" (Ereignis), a natural event, an act of freedom, a "making" (Machen) which the pupil himself discovers when choosing the good and rejecting the bad.

Admittedly obedience is of the essence of morality; but everything depends on what is obeyed and how it is

obeyed. "But," says Herbart, "not every obedience to the first chance command is moral. The individual obeying must have examined, chosen, valued the command; that is, he himself must have raised it for himself to the level of a command. *The moral man commands himself.*" [1]

In our own time a similar distinction has been made by Bergson between a *social* and a *human* morality, between which, he says, there is a difference, not of degree, but of kind.[2] Social morality is a set of habits, a pattern of behavior, which is instilled by a process of training and which is for the general benefit of the existing structure of society; but human morality is a mystical sense of obligation produced by an "élan d'amour," an emotional gesture, embracing the whole of humanity, and is itself one of the highest manifestations in the individual of the creative force of evolution. I shall not, myself, adopt such a mystical explanation of this second type of morality, but Bergson is undoubtedly right in distinguishing it clearly from social morality and in giving it an altogether higher place in the scale of human values.

But now let us ask, with Herbart, *what* is it that the moral man commands himself? Such a question, in Herbart's time, threw the philosophers into universal confusion. Kant, as is well known, by a species of solipsism, invented the "categorical imperative." Command yourself, he said, to be commanded by your profoundest intuitions of the moral law. "Act on maxims which can at the same time have for their object themselves as universal laws of nature." Other philosophers have given different answers—various theoretical or utilitarian concepts of virtue which the individual must, paradoxically by an act

of free will, obey. But Herbart was the first to point out the true state of affairs—that the moral man does not command himself to do anything concrete or definite; that what exists is a certain predisposition of the will, a certain readiness to act in any given situation. The categories of morality are dynamic, not static; they are inspired by a kind of primary energy, an original source of personal power—a power, that is to say, not of doing, but of *willing*. Obedience follows when this power is *engaged* by a concrete situation, when willing becomes action. For this reason Herbart calls this willing, which is real but not conditioned, an unconditioned *manifold*.

It is important to understand this subtle distinction, for the whole philosophy of education which follows hinges upon it. We must fully appreciate the fact that *obedience*, in this account of the moral disposition, does not relate to specific commandments, does not arise only with reference to particular circumstances; but is rather a creative self-command, controlling at will all manifestations of instinct and desire. In psychoanalytical terms, we might correlate the unconditioned manifold of Herbart with the "super-ego," to which, as you will remember, Freud ascribes a function somewhat wider than the conscience—describing it as "something which enjoys a certain independence, pursues its own ends, and is independent of the ego as regards the energy at its disposal." [8]

If we have a clear realization of the indeterminate nature of this basic moral energy, which in fact, strictly speaking becomes moral only as and when it is manifested in concrete situations, then we shall understand how impossible it is to suppose that such energy can be built up or formed by the intellect. It is to be infallible in its

action, spontaneous in its application; but, as Herbart says, its composition [4] cannot be merely logical. "It cannot be learned from a well-classified doctrine of morality; such a doctrine cools the will, and does not impel it. It requires much rather a partly poetical, partly pragmatic composition."

In a situation truly moral a person acts spontaneously. He is not commanded to act: he does not even command himself to act. It is not a question of *ought* or of *must*: there is no theoretical necessity to act in the way he does, and, as Herbart says, "to honour a command does not mean bowing to the inevitable." Herbart is very insistent on this point: the moral man, in his acts of obedience, is not conscious of being the owner of an inner store of feeling and life, is not conscious, as we would now say, of the existence and functioning of his super-ego. "He dare not appear to himself as giving the decisive sentence"—the first essential of morality is destroyed if in any sense *will* becomes the ground of *command*—if what happens is merely that one form of arbitrariness is put in the place of another. The moral man is intrinsically humble; he acts from necessity, but it is not a necessity which he can even desire to submit to the test of reason.

Though he does not act from rational necessity, nor from legal or social necessity, nevertheless the moral man acts from a necessity of some kind; and so Herbart comes to the conclusion that, among all known necessities, the only one left for consideration is *aesthetic* necessity. Can it be that in his acts of goodness the moral man obeys an aesthetic necessity?

In answering this question in the affirmative Herbart

was following the lead ultimately of Plato, but more immediately of Schiller, whose *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man* had been published only a few years previously. He may also have been influenced by Schelling, in whose system of Transcendental Idealism the aesthetic activity is fundamental—the only link between the Ideal and the Real. But Herbart makes no mention of these precursors, and, indeed, his argument is so closely reasoned that it has no need of extraneous support.

His first point is that aesthetic judgment [5] is absolute —it speaks entirely without proof, without attempting to enforce its claims; it takes no account of inclinations: it arises on the clear presentation of its object and is then spontaneous. There are as many aesthetic judgments as there are objects inviting such judgment, and such judgments are not related to each other in any way so as to be logically deducible from one another. It is true that formal similarities can be discovered among various objects, and that these naturally lead to similar judgments. But these formal relations—harmony in music, for example—demand absolute or simple judgments—they do not explain or prove anything.

Before Herbart, already Leibniz and Kant had admitted the absolute but irrational nature of aesthetic judgment, and the *Critique of Judgment* must have been fresh in Herbart's mind. But Kant had never dared to make the simple correlation between the moral will and the aesthetic judgment which Herbart made the basis of his theory of moral education.

What Herbart perceived as necessary in any system of moral education—and his intuition at this point is decisive—was a training which led to a natural state of self-

discipline or inner control. What was required was some form of mental exercise, some practice of the will, which would give the will a perfected ability to make a choice, to exercise judgment, *to act.* We have already seen that such a choice should be free; that no element of calculation should enter into it, for he who calculates does not obey with his will, but discriminates with his reason.

Herbart found such a training in what he called "the aesthetic revelation of the world," and by this he meant an ever-expanding exercise, in the child, of aesthetic choice, aesthetic appreciation, and, perhaps, aesthetic creation. This, in effect, is what he says: Throw open the whole visible world to the child, arouse as many desires as you like, but don't let him be overwhelmed by them. Teach him to discriminate among the host of sensations which are aroused in him. Make him realize that he has within him an immeasurable store of will power which he can release when, where, and how necessity dictates. The necessity that dictates will be impersonal, a discipline determined by his aesthetic judgment, his innate taste. At this point Herbart becomes a little obscure, perhaps because he had no innate taste of his own. But I will give a paraphrase of his words: he imagines a boy to whom the world is a rich open circle filled with manifold life, and which this boy proceeds to examine in all its parts.[6] What he can reach, he will touch and investigate; the rest he will look at and transfer to his mind. Herbart assumes that he will take the measure of individuals, compare modes of living and classes of society according to their splendor, advantages and freedom. This seems to argue a degree of reason in the boy which might be priggish, but such a boy might be presumed, at least in thought, to

taste, to choose and to imitate among the things he sees. Even if he makes no choice, but just drifts in the pursuit of the pleasures of the moment, he will at any rate collect a store of keenly observed phenomena, and he will gradually perceive the necessity for discriminating among them. Herbart assumes that "his concentrated reflection will grasp all relations; the contrast of the ridiculous and the seemly will determine his judgment as easily as his behaviour." He will be predisposed to recognize and value the beauty of goodness, and out of these perceptions he will "prepare for himself a law," *for he cannot do otherwise* if he is free and has been absorbed first in the aesthetic comprehension of the world surrounding him, and not in the calculations of egoism.

At this point I would take leave of Herbart, for when it comes to the question how a general aesthetic revelation of the world must be planned by the educator, he has little to suggest beyond "early and wide reading of chosen classical poets," and, more vaguely, "the exercise of the pupils' perceptive power in the comprehension of works of art of all kinds." In this respect Herbart was hopelessly confined within the narrow concepts of art characteristic of his period. There may be good reason for feeding the imagination of the young boy (and Herbart was thinking of boys under ten) on the Homeric poems; that primitive world is one in which the child's imagination can accommodate itself. But there is more substance, and more realism, in Herbart's brief reference to the function of play in education. "The boy plays in real life," he says, "and it is by play that he realises for himself his imaginings," a sentence which echoes Schiller's insistence on the significance of play ("Der Mensch

spielt nur, wo er in voller Bedeutung des Wortes Mensch ist, und er ist nur da ganz Mensch, wo er spielt"). And in the end Herbart returns to the concrete meaning of aesthetic revelation, as a developing knowledge or concept of nature of increasing sharpness of outline, as a system of forces and motions which, rigorously persistent in a course once begun, forms for us a type of law, and order, and sharply defined proportion. "Man," he says finely, "stands in the midst of nature; himself a part of her, her power streaming through his innermost self, he answering external force with *his* own according to *his* method, *his* nature, first thinking, then willing, then working. Through his will goes the chain of nature." [7]

With these words Herbart aligns himself clearly with Plato, and it is in Plato that we find the most practical proposals for a system of aesthetic education, designed for the automatic guidance of the moral will. This system, which is outlined in the third book of the *Republic* and more thoroughly in the second book of the *Laws*, is based on the still sound presupposition that a child's first experiences in life are its feelings of pleasure and pain, and it proceeds to the equally sound assumption that effective education is simply "learning to feel pleasure and pain about the right things." Plato then asks the same question as Herbart: what is there in the universe which is always concretely and objectively "right"—what is there that cannot fail to give pleasure to man? And he answers that question in the same positive but exclusive way: there is only aesthetic experience, and of all forms of aesthetic experience, the most direct in its action and infallible in effect is music. Plato therefore suggests that the whole education of the child should be

pursued by aesthetic methods, above all by means of "choric art"—that is to say, the art of song accompanied by music and dance. Song is linked with poetry, and dance with gymnastics, and a natural expansion of education is envisaged which will finally include arithmetic, geometry and astronomy.

I think it is a mistake to pursue Plato's ideals too far into their practical details, which had in view a social economy very different from ours. Wrestling, for example, which had great significance for the Greeks in view of their methods of warfare, is not an educational aim of much importance in an age of atomic warfare. What is important to appreciate, and indeed to accept, is the basic principle—that aesthetic training is also at the same time moral training; and to understand why Plato could put forward such an idea with complete seriousness and without any feeling of paradox. He was basing himself, of course, upon a doctrine generally accepted throughout the Hellenic world—the doctrine of universal harmony, of which Pythagoras had been the original exponent.[8]

This conception of a basic world harmony has persisted throughout the history of science and philosophy, and in a certain sense is, of course, the hypothesis upon which science itself proceeds. But whatever wider philosophical significance it may have, it is certain that the whole field of aesthetics, and particularly the concrete phenomena of art, are based upon harmony. Works of art, of whatever kind, give aesthetic pleasure when they illustrate universal laws of proportion and rhythm; that is, harmonic intervals of space or time. A work of art may do more than this—it may communicate intuitions or thoughts—but unless it has some basic harmonic form

it is not a work of art. Such harmony need not necessarily be simple: indeed, as Bacon said, "there is no excellent beauty that hath not some strangeness in the proportion," a qualification, however, which Plato might have found difficult to admit.

The whole object of Plato's system of education is to produce a concord between art and behavior, between the concreteness of beauty and the ethos of holiness or nobility. Plato, indeed, seems to have contemplated something as physical as a conditioned reflex. Here are some of the specific recommendations given in the *Laws:*

"All young creatures are naturally full of fire, and can keep neither their limbs nor their voices quiet. They are perpetually breaking into disorderly cries and jumps, but whereas no other animal develops a sense of order of either kind, mankind forms a solitary exception. Order in movement is called *rhythm*, order in articulation—the blending of acute with grave—*pitch*, and the name of the combination of the two is *choric art.*"

"The choric art as a whole we found to be the same thing as the whole of education, and one half of the art, that which has to do with the voice, consists of rhythms and melodies. . . . And the part which deals with bodily movement has rhythm in common with the movements of the voice, but posture and gesticulation are proper to it, just as melody, on the other side, is to vocal movement. . . . The training of the voice to goodness, continued till it reaches the soul, we named, in a sense, music. . . . As for the training of the body—we spoke of it as the dancing of creatures at play—when the process culminates in goodness of body, let us call scientific bodily discipline with that purpose gymnastic. . . . This art . . . has its origin in the habitual leaping native to all living things, and in mankind . . . the acquisition of a sense of rhythm has generated dancing;

since melody suggests and awakens consciousness of rhythm, the two in conjunction have given rise to the play of the choric dance." [9]

These quotations should suffice to show the practical nature of education in Plato's mature thought. It is not a question, as it is with us, of acquiring knowledge, of accumulating facts, of learning history or economics or physics. Education is primarily—that is to say, in its early stages—*physical culture*; it is concerned with the body, and *music* is that kind of physical culture which will produce mental excellence. Plato felt that there was a danger of making education too presumptuous: we must keep, he said, our seriousness for serious things—that is to say, our relationship to God—and as for the rest, all of us should fall in with our rôle and spend life in making our *play* as perfect as possible. Man at his best is God's plaything, and the best way of conducting our lives is to play so as to please God. "We should pass our lives," Plato concluded, "in the playing of games—*certain* games, that is, sacrifice, song and dance—in order to gain Heaven's grace . . ."

These ideas of Plato have been echoed, nearer our time, in the Hellenic philosophy and "gay wisdom," as he would have it called, of Nietzsche. Though Nietzsche wrote a book on *The Future of Our Educational Institutions*, it is not there that we find his profoundest insight into the problem, but in later works which deal more generally with philosophical and ethical problems. Nietzsche realized that hitherto every "science of morals" had omitted the problem of morality itself—the pretentions of various philosophers "to give a basis to morality" proved merely, on examination, to be a learned form of

good faith in prevailing morality. In other words, philosophers had never looked outside themselves, outside man, for a basis of morality. Like Plato, Nietzsche proposed that we should look to nature "which teaches us to hate the *laisser-aller*, the too great freedom, and implants the need for limited horizons, for immediate duties—which teaches *the narrowing of perspectives.*" Everything in nature, he pointed out, which exhibits "freedom, elegance, boldness, dance and masterly certainty, which exists or has existed, whether it be in thought itself, or in administration, or in speaking and persuading, in art just as in conduct, has only developed by means of the tyranny of such arbitrary law"; and Nietzsche then points to the practice of art, where the free arranging, locating, disposing, and constructing in moments of inspiration is achieved only by the artist's obedience to a thousand laws, which, by their very rigidness and precision, defy all formulation by means of ideas. The essential thing, he says, is that "there should be long *obedience* in the same direction; and thereby results, and always has resulted in the long run, something which has made life worth living; for instance, virtue, art, music, dancing, reason, spirituality—anything whatever that is transfiguring, refined, foolish, or divine." (*Beyond Good and Evil*, §188.)

Instinctive obedience to an aesthetic law—that might be given as Nietzsche's formula for a method of education which is, at the same time, the foundation of virtue or morality. It is, it will be seen, the same formula as Plato's and Herbart's; and though none of these philosophers presents exactly the same argument, or gives exactly the same emphasis to each phase of the educa-

tional process, all agree that the essential stages are these:

(a) the recognition of the necessity of an order of discipline beyond morality itself;
(b) the admission that the only necessity of this kind is aesthetic harmony;
(c) the instinctive nature of the obedience to be achieved by moral education.

I think the only further point which still needs to be rescued from current misconceptions concerns the nature of discipline. At the best, discipline is conceived as a method of achieving a certain end—firmness in danger, courage in adversity, endurance, social conformity, etc. It is even usual to consider it as no more than a systematic control of natural movements, as the reverse of liberty. We all know what, in scholastic circles, is meant by "a good disciplinarian"! Such a conception altogether misrepresents the true nature of discipline, especially in the context of education. Discipline from our point of view should be regarded, not as a means, but as an end. It is a branch of learning, and what is learnt is a positive ritual—a ritualistic control of the movements of the body and the field of attention. Group discipline, or social discipline, is what Plato called *sacrifice*, the performance of mass rituals. I am reminded that a philosopher with whom I was acquainted in my younger days would make an annual pilgrimage to the Aldershot Military Tattoo, which he regarded as the greatest work of art at that time available in England. We now have an art of ballet which is far more accessible to the general public, and which illustrates on a smaller scale the aesthetic value of disciplined actions. When Plato and Nietzsche speak of disci-

pline, they have such types of coherent action in mind—they are certainly not thinking of a state of cowed obedience enforced by a master, rod in hand!

The value of such discipline lies in the freedom it confers. It is not only a mechanism which releases inspiration, as every writer or artist knows; it guarantees that the inspiration thus released shall flow in easy channels—that the mind, like the body, shall act with readiness, with economy, with precision. Athletic form, aesthetic form, ethical form—it is perfectly right that we should, in each context, use the word "form." The form, in each case, is fundamentally identical. Plato further asserts that form in the physical sense ensures form in the spiritual or ethical sense; or, at least, that we can by training set up an inevitable association between physical and ethical form, the transition being effected by aesthetic exercises (by choric art, for example) which are partly physical and partly spiritual.

We should perhaps hesitate to use the word "inevitable" to describe the relationship between aesthetic education and moral virtue. Plato does clearly imply that once embarked on, his system of education inevitably leads to moral virtue. The element of choice, of free will, is present only when we decide to undergo such a training. It is possible that our modern research into the mechanism of the conditioned reflex lends support to Plato, but we must also try to reconcile our theory with the structure of the mental personality as revealed in psychoanalysis.

Unfortunately for our purposes psychoanalysis is a science of individual psychology, and except for Freud's essay on group psychology and the work of Trigant

Burrow and his associates, it has so far made little attempt to deal positively with social morality. The superego, or ego-ideal, which represents the moral principle in psychoanalysis, is nearly always treated as an isolated, personal structure. But the essence of morality, of course, is that it is universal—at any rate, that it is common to a specific group. Plato, for example, would never for a moment separate his concept of the virtuous man from his concept of the good citizen: the concepts are interchangeable.

In an important footnote to his essay on group psychology,[10] Freud admits that he has left part of the riddle of group formations untouched. "A far more fundamental and comprehensive psychological analysis would have to intervene at this point. A path leads by way of *imitation* to *empathy*, that is, to the comprehension of the mechanism by means of which we are enabled to take up any attitude at all towards another mental life. Moreover, there is still much to be explained in the manifestations of existing identifications. These result among other things in a person limiting his aggressiveness towards those with whom he has identified himself, and in his sparing them and giving them help."

Freud has previously explained that "identification," which is a technical term in psychoanalysis signifying the expression of an emotional tie with another person, may arise with every new perception of a common quality shared with some other person who is not an object of the sexual instinct. "We already begin to divine," Freud says, "that the mutual tie between the members of a group is in the nature of an identification of this kind, based upon an important emotional common quality; and

we may suspect that this common quality lies in the nature of the tie with the leader. *Another suspicion* may tell us that we are far from having exhausted the problem of identification, and that we are faced by the process which psychology calls 'empathy' (Einfühlung), and which plays the largest part in our understanding of what is inherently foreign to our ego in other people. But we shall here limit ourselves to the immediate emotional effects of identification, and shall leave to one side its significance for our intellectual life." [11]

It is precisely this significance of the process of identification for intellectual life that is our present concern. When Freud says that a path leads *by way of imitation to empathy*, he may or may not have been aware that he was indicating the path of art.[12] It is true that there is another path—identification with the leader—the totalitarian path in which there is no empathic relationship with other people, but only a blind obedience to one command. But that is not what we mean by morality: morality is essentially mutuality, the sharing of a common ideal. And the process by which we are induced to share a common ideal is none other than that indicated by Freud—the creation of an empathic relationship with our fellow citizens by means of common rituals, by means of the imitation of the same patterns—by meeting, as it were, in the common form or quality of the universally valid work of art.

From this psychological point of view the social function of art takes on an additional importance: it saves us from identification with a leader; it excludes the tyranny of the person; it unites us in the impersonal beauty of art.

I am willing to admit that art, in taking on such an important role in the educational and social development of mankind, must itself be modified. It is too often a wayward, partial, even perverse expression of universal harmony. It is too often but an expression of personal phantasies, of egoistic and aggressive impulses. It is prostituted to purposes which destroy its aesthetic nature. Our whole conception of art will have to be at once enlarged and purified. Plato recognized that necessity, and had elaborate schemes for its control and for the establishment of irrefutable canons of art. But control and censorship lead to the old danger of blind obedience, of will-less conformity. The perfection of art must arise from its practice—from the discipline of tools and materials, of form and function. For that reason we must give priority in our education to all forms of aesthetic activity, for in the course of making beautiful things there will take place a crystallization of the emotions into patterns which are the molds of virtue. Such patterns are in effect social patterns, the patterns assumed by human relationships, and their harmony is part of the universal harmony, made manifest in life no less than in art.

VI

THE EDUCATION OF FREE MEN

The social question will be decided by molecular processes in the life of the people which bring the tissue of society to a new birth. It will be decided from below, not from above, as an effect of freedom, not by an act of conformity.

N. Berdyaev.

VI

THE EDUCATION OF FREE MEN

1. What Is the Purpose of Education?

"THE true object of education," wrote William Godwin in the first sentence of his *Enquirer* (1797), "like that of every other moral process, is the generation of happiness." I know of no better definition of the aim of education, but like all definitions, it is regressive, throwing us back on the need for further definitions. What, for example, is meant by the word "generation"—is it a natural process which requires only encouragement, or is it a regimen enforced by a special technique of teaching? And can happiness be defined in a way which would include the contradictory desires of any average group of men? More interesting, perhaps, than the definition itself is Godwin's parenthesis, which asserts without argument that education is "a moral process." A century and a half ago that might have been an obvious point of view, but it is a measure of our different outlook today that we would not immediately agree that morality enters into the question. The precept "Be good, and let who will be wise," would not nowadays find acceptance even in a Sunday school. Education—we do not say, but unconsciously assume—is an acquisitive process, directed to *vocation*. It is a collecting of means for a specific end, and

most of the complaints about our educational system are directed against the adequacy of such means, or the failure to specify clearly enough the ends. Efficiency, progress, success—these are the aims of a competitive system from which all moral factors are necessarily excluded. In that respect, at least, our schools reflect truly enough our social order.

Happiness is an individual affair. It is ripeness in each fruit: the full degree of maturation, of sweetness, of fertility. But the fruit hangs on a tree, and though the fruits do not all ripen at exactly the same time, or in the same degree, the health of the tree is shown by its over-all ripeness. As Godwin went on to say, man is a social being. "In society the interests of individuals are intertwisted with each other, and cannot be separated. Men should be taught to assist each other." In other words, a factor in individual happiness is mutual aid, and these two aspects of man's existence are interdependent. Education is the process of their adjustment.

All the possible words we may use to express the purpose of education—tuition, instruction, upbringing, discipline, the acquisition of knowledge, the inculcation of manners or morality—all these reduce to two complementary processes, which we can best describe as "individual growth" and "social initiation." In no respect do the educational systems characteristic of the various nations of today favor either of these processes. Either they force individual growth into a pattern which destroys its natural grace and vigor; or if a free and independent person does emerge from the process of education, it is only to find himself at odds with a society into whose concept of normality he does not fit.

The trouble about happiness, as Aristotle pointed out, is that it is a platitude: to give it as the aim of education, or of political science, seems somewhat superficial, especially to people with pretensions to wisdom, who are often animated by a desire to make men suffer before they enjoy. In Christian philosophy especially, there is always a premium attached to happiness. It is very necessary, of course, to deepen the concept of happiness, because we all soon discover how impermanent is the sense of well-being which comes from good nourishment, a pleasant environment, adequate means and perfect health. Happiness, in a word, is *psychological*, and all material riches are worthless unless we have peace of mind. This was realized by the ancient philosophers, by Confucius and Lâo-tse, by Socrates and Aristotle; and they therefore defined happiness in some such words as did Aristotle, who said that it is "an activity of the soul in accordance with perfect virtue." But that, again, is merely a definition which demands further definitions, and so Aristotle had to define what he meant by *virtue*. He came to the conclusion that there was no such thing as virtue, but only virtues, intellectual and moral. Wisdom and understanding, knowing how to act or behave in given circumstances, the science of life—that is one aspect of virtue; but a man may have all this knowledge but not be able to control his own impulses and desires. He may have perfect understanding, but be a creature of bad habits. Knowledge and self-discipline are therefore two different aspects of virtue, both essential to happiness and both to be learned in the normal course of education.

The difference between these two aspects of virtue—let us follow the usual practice and call them intellectual

and moral virtue—is that whilst the first can be made a subject of general agreement, the second depends on the temperament or disposition of the individual. Intellectual virtue can be codified and accepted as a system of beliefs and customs; but moral virtue is the interior function of each man's physiological and nervous make-up. Since a man deficient in moral virtue cannot be expected to appreciate properly the values of intellectual virtue, moral virtue has a fundamental priority in education. The first question in education, therefore, is how best to develop the moral virtues of children—that is to say, how best to train the physical senses with which each individual is endowed so that they mature to that state of temperance, harmony and skill which will enable the individual to pursue the intellectual virtues in freedom of will and singleness of mind.

Aristotle pointed out that moral virtue—the integrated personality, as modern psychologists would say—comes about as a result of habit. We are conditioned by nature to form habits, and the form our habits should take is inherent in nature. "Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them and are made perfect by habit."

The pattern of those habits which we are adapted to receive—i.e., to be taught—is found in nature: from nature we must take that pattern, and by habituating our children to that pattern, we shall perfect their moral virtue and enable them to achieve true happiness. That does not mean that we are slaves to nature, but that we can discover freedom only in nature. The free man is a man of nature, perfected in natural ways of behavior.

Such is the theory of Aristotle: he derived it in a large measure from Plato, and to Plato we must turn for a detailed account of this natural pattern and of the only effective method of adapting ourselves to it. But first let us note that the general tradition of education in Europe and America since the Renaissance has neglected or distorted this classical theory of education—first by blurring the clear distinction between intellectual and moral virtue, and then by ignoring the essential priority of moral virtue, by attempting to inculcate intellectual virtue into minds which have not received the necessary preparation. It is only onto a stock of goodness that knowledge can be safely grafted: by grafting it onto stocks that are unbalanced, undeveloped, neurotic, we merely give power to impulses that may in themselves be evil or corrupted.

2. The Pattern in Nature

To suggest that the pattern of moral virtue is to be found in nature seems immediately to involve us in a scientific approach to our subject. We have become so prejudiced by the claims put forward by certain scientists that we have been content to leave "nature" to science, and to let it be assumed that "art" is something outside nature. Science implies measurement and classification—what is called "scientific method" or analysis. But it is only one "method" and wisdom, which includes science in its scope, implies also synthesis—the apprehension and understanding of wholes and relationships, the workings of the imagination and creative activity—in short, a subjective and sensational approach to reality; and this aspect of wisdom might be called the method of

art, or the "aesthetic method." As such, it must be regarded as an indispensable instrument of education; and since the scientific method is not within the mental capacity of young children, and the aesthetic method is natural to them, we must turn to art as the only method available for the first stages of education.

During the past fifty years a world-wide revolution has taken place in the appreciation of children's art; gradually we have come to realize that we have in art an instrument of education and not merely a subject to be taught. Children have an art, that is to say, a way of expressing themselves in visual and plastic images, appropriate to their stage of mental development, and this pictorial language of theirs is something which exists in its own rights and which is not to be judged by adult standards. It is a means of communication possessed by every child, and one which can be used to give us an understanding of the child and to give the child an understanding of its environment. Art is not now an "extra": we no longer seek to pick out a few children with what used to be called an artistic temperament, and educate this minority to be artists. We recognize an artist of some kind in every child, and we maintain that the encouragement of a normal creative activity is one of the essentials of a full and balanced development of the personality.

This is a revolution to which many philosophers, psychologists and teachers have contributed, but it was John Ruskin who first suggested that the child's artistic activity should be entirely voluntary. It was an English psychologist, James Sully, who first made any considerable study of the characteristics of this voluntary activity. But great educationalists all over the world, following the

lead of Froebel, were beginning to insist on the importance of spontaneity in all forms of education. The position we have now reached implies a claim that of all forms of spontaneous activity, a special educative value attaches to the artistic activity.

From this point of view, art is not to be treated as something external which has to be inserted into the general scheme of education. Nor, on the other hand, can education be regarded as something which can ever be complete without art. There is a certain way of life which we hold to be good, and the creative activity which we call art is essential to it. Education is nothing but an initiation into this way of life, and we believe that in no way is that initiation so successfully achieved as through the practice of art.

Art, that is to say, is a way of education; not so much a subject to be taught as a method of teaching any and all subjects. For this view of the educative rôle of art no originality can be claimed: we are but restating in modern terms the ideals which Plato expressed twenty-four centuries ago. And when we say we are restating these ideals in modern terms we do not mean that we are adapting Plato's ideas to modern needs. We are not distorting his meaning or intention in any one particular. When Plato uses abstract terms like harmony, grace and rhythm, and when we use the same abstract terms, we want to convey exactly the same meaning. It is only when we use more particular terms, like music or painting or architecture, that we diverge a little from Plato in that we illustrate our meaning from our richer store of experience. It does not follow that we are any nearer to the truth than Plato, but we are entitled to claim, if we have any faith at all in

human evolution, that the use we can make of arts like music or painting or architecture is potentially much greater than it was for Plato. But only potentially. For what is the history of the modern world, a world so rich potentially, but one long record of unrealized potentialities, of missed opportunities? Not much is known about that obscure subject, Greek music; but not even our classical scholars have ventured to suggest that Greek music was anything but a primitive affair in comparison with the music of Bach, of Mozart, of Beethoven. But what proportional use have we ever made of this modern art in education? Our music, compared with Greek music, is a veritable extension of human sensibility. But what commensurate place does it occupy in our schools? We have eurhythmics, it is true, and let us pay all honor to Dalcroze who has in this one aspect of education set us on the right path. But even in those schools which have been wholly devoted to Dalcroze's ideals, it is to be doubted whether we have advanced even so far as the educational methods contemplated by Plato on the basis of the primitive music of Greece.

The claims made by Plato for an aesthetic mode of education are quite simply stated. Indeed, one cannot do better than translate Plato's own words. "We attach such supreme importance to musical education"—he makes Socrates say in the *Republic* (III, 401–2), "because rhythm and harmony sink most deeply into the recesses of the soul, and take most powerful hold of it, bringing gracefulness in their train, and making a man graceful if he be rightly nurtured, but if not, the reverse." Plato then describes in what we call considerable psychological detail, the exact effects of rhythm and harmony on the

growing mind. But he does not, as is too often assumed in the discussions of his educational theories, ascribe these qualities to music only. He says that the same qualities "enter largely into painting and all similar workmanship, into weaving and embroidery, into architecture, as well as the whole manufacture of utensils in general, nay, into the constitution of living bodies, and of all plants; for in all these things gracefulness or ungracefulness finds place." And he adds, for he has always the negative picture in mind, "The absence of grace, rhythm, and harmony is closely related to an evil style and an evil character."

There is something at once so simple and so comprehensive about this theory of Plato's that really we do not need to go beyond it. Music, painting, the making of useful objects, the proportions of the living body and of plants, these will, if made the basis of our educational methods, instill into the child a grace and harmony which will give it, not merely a noble bearing, but also a noble character; not only a graceful body, but also a sober mind. It will do this, says Plato, long before the child is able to reason, because it will inculcate what he calls, "the instinct of relationship," [1] and it is upon this instinct that reason itself depends. Possessing this instinct, the child will never do wrong in deed or in thought.

I ought perhaps to explain, at this point, what Plato meant by this "instinct of relationship," for it is the foundation of his theory of education, and one, moreover, which he never abandoned throughout the development of this thought. The theory as I have already given it comes from The *Republic*. This was a work of the philosopher's early maturity. Thirty years later, at the age of

seventy, Plato wrote his *Laws*, which Professor Taylor has described as "today the least generally known of Plato's major compositions," and yet "in some respects his most characteristic work." [2] Here, in Book II, we find his theory of education through art restated in unmistakable terms—"handled," as Professor Taylor says, "with a psychological thoroughness to which the *Republic* affords no parallel." The theory, I would maintain, is as simple as it is true. It is this: that the aim of education should be to associate feelings of pleasure with what is good and feelings of pain with what is evil. Now such *feelings* are aesthetic—a fact which would have been obvious to the Greeks. This word "aesthetic" as we use it is cold and abstract, but it indicates a relationship which to the Greeks was very real and organic, a property of the physiological reactions which take place in the process of perception.

Now, says Plato, there exist in the physical universe, which we experience through our senses, certain rhythms, melodies, and abstract proportions which when perceived convey to the open mind a sensation of pleasure. For the moment we need not consider *why* these rhythms and proportions exist: they are simply part of the given universe. But if, says Plato, we can associate the concrete sensation of pleasure given by these rhythms and proportions with good, and the concrete sensation of pain given by the opposite qualities of disharmony and ugliness with evil; if we can do this systematically in the early years, while the infant mind is still open to such influences, then we shall have set up an association between natural and spontaneous feelings and graceful or noble behavior. Lest it should be thought that I am reading into Plato

more than is justified, let me quote his actual words, as translated by Professor Taylor:

"And therefore what I would say is this: a child's first infant consciousness is that of pleasure and pain, this is the domain wherein the soul first acquires virtue or vice. . . . By education I mean goodness in the form in which it is first acquired by a child. In fact, if pleasure and liking, pain and dislike, are formed in the soul on right lines before the age of understanding is reached, and when that age is attained, these feelings are in concord with understanding, thanks to early discipline in appropriate habits —this concord, regarded as a whole, is virtue. But if you consider the one factor in it, the rightly disciplined state of pleasures and pains whereby a man, from his first beginnings on, will abhor what he should abhor and relish what he should relish—if you isolate this factor and call it education, you will be giving it its true name."

Plato then illustrates his argument in this way: "No young creature whatsoever . . . can keep its body or its voice still: they are all perpetually trying to make movements and noises. They leap and bound, they dance and frolic, as it were with glee, and again, they utter cries of all sorts. Now animals at large have no perception of order or disorder in these motions, no sense of what we call rhythm or melody." But man, Plato goes on to point out, is distinguished from the rest of animal creation precisely by the fact that he possesses an aesthetic sense, which he defines as "the power to perceive and enjoy rhythm and melody." Link this power of aesthetic perception to the power of discriminating between good and evil and then the most fundamental aim of educa-

tion has been achieved. Good is *spontaneously* associated with pleasure, evil with pain.

Such is Plato's theory of education, and it seems to be essentially simple and obviously true. Why, then, should it offer such difficulty and, indeed, incomprehensibility to the modern educator? Professor Taylor, in his Introduction to his translation of the *Laws*, offers this explanation: "To Plato, as a true Greek, the ugliness of conduct which is morally out of place is the most immediately salient fact about it, and the beauty of holiness, if the scriptural phrase may be permitted, is something more than a metaphor. To judge by the tone of much of our literature, we are less sensitive on the point; we seem slow to perceive ugliness in wrongdoing as such, or even ready to concede the "artistry" of great wickedness. It may be a wholesome discipline to consider carefully whether this difference of feeling may not be due less to a confusion on Plato's part between the beautiful and the morally good than to a certain aesthetic imperceptiveness on ours."

3. Art and Human Nature.

Plato was an authoritarian. His political utopia has always been a model for exponents of the totalitarian state. It is therefore necessary to ask ourselves whether there does not lurk in this theory of education some denial of that freedom and integrity of the human personality which is the basis of our libertarian philosophy. Granted the prevalence of "aesthetic imperceptiveness," this danger would surely exist: the "order of nature" would be interpreted in a systematic and insensitive manner, and the emergent faculties of the child would

then be "conditioned" to this rigid pattern. Plato's republic can undoubtedly be regarded as a rigid pattern of this kind: it is the creation of a poet, but its beauty is objective, calculated, classical: it is like a crystal of ice. But nature is a living growth, and human nature is warm and mobile. Between the form natural to growth, which is a creative achievement of the life force or whatever impulse animates organic matter, and the forms abstracted by the human intellect, there is this difference: the one is a continuing process of freedom or spontaneity, of growth and integration, whereas the other is an act of objectification, or externalization and fixation, of cooling and petrification. Our criticism of Plato, if this were the place to pursue it, would charge him with abstracting from the natural process, making of it a measured pattern, and thereby destroying its quality of spontaneity, which in the human personality is the quality of spiritual freedom.

Two quite distinct developments during the past sixty years have made it possible for us to accept Plato's theory of the place of art in education without incurring the dangers which it would offer to imperceptive minds. One is the complete revolution which has taken place in our conception of art itself, and the other is the revolution in psychology.

The revolution in art is by no means complete, nor has a definite new standard or style yet been established. To some people it seems that the present state of art is merely confused and incoherent. But it must be obvious, even to the most bewildered spectator of the modern scene, that there is more essential similarity between a modern functional building and the Parthenon

than between the Parthenon and the classical buildings of our own time. The functional building and the Parthenon both exhibit the same fundamental features of good architecture—fitness for purpose, harmony of proportions, good manners—whereas a modern building in the classical style can be described only as a fantasy in architectural inappropriateness. As for modern painting, there again one need not accept all its confused manifestations as a progress towards the ideal of beauty which Plato had in mind. Nevertheless, those with an eye to see, and no censoring prejudice, will find among these confused manifestations of the modern spirit works of art which answer to the Platonic canon, and are symbols of the grace and rhythm and harmony which led Plato to make art the basis of his educational system. One can assert of all the arts that a spirit of enquiry and scientific understanding has, during the last thirty years or so, led us back to the basic principles, and that though we cannot yet point to the creative achievements of a great age, we are now in a position to understand the significance of art such as has not existed since Plato's time. That is a large claim to make for the modern philosophy of art; it is perhaps a conceited claim. But however humble and sober-minded we may be, it is difficult to find any intermediate period which reached such an understanding. It is true that during the Renaissance there were great humanists like Alberti who owed much to the Platonic doctrine, and the art of that period was, of course, a much nearer approximation to Plato's ideals than anything we have so far produced in the modern period. But neither Alberti nor any of the later humanists, however far they went

in the direction of identifying moral and aesthetic ideals, ever committed themselves to anything as radical as an aesthetic method of education. They were all grammarians at heart, and like Browning's hero,[8] had "decided not to live but know," a noble ideal for the few who are content to work "dead from the waist down," but not a principle for those who believe with Plato that the function of education is to promote the good life.

However much an increased understanding of the nature of art has enabled us to appreciate the truth and relevance of Plato's theory of education, we have been helped in an even larger measure by the increased understanding of human nature which we owe to modern psychology. Adequately to demonstrate this fact would lead us into a technical discussion which would not be appropriate now, but perhaps I might briefly indicate three directions in which modern psychology tends to support our claims.

The first relates to the significance of imagery in thought—imagery of all kinds, although it is simpler to discuss the subject in terms of visual imagery. We know, on the basis of many recent experiments, that the child begins life with a mind full of extremely vivid imagery. One school of psychologists even maintains that in the first years the child has difficulty in distinguishing between its perceptions of the external world and its secondary images, and that the normal memory-image is only gradually separated from these vivid eidetic images. Whatever may be the truth of this theory, we do know for certain that the next stage in development, the stage of conceptual thought, is reached only by the gradual suppression of imagery. Now the whole Aristotelian

tradition in education is so committed to the superiority of conceptual or logical processes of thought that all means have been taken to drive images out of the child's mind and to make it an efficient thinking machine. It was accepted as axiomatic that logical methods of procedure were uniquely efficient, and the ambition of every pedagogue was to devise a logical scheme for every subject in the curriculum. It was experimentally established that images performed no useful function in abstract thought, and the more abstract the thought the more intelligent it was assumed to be. To quote a well-known educationalist,[4] "Those children of the most fertile imagery . . . were by no means those of the highest school intelligence . . . the correlations between vivid and clear visual and auditory imagery and school intelligence are low, or it may be negative . . ." and so on.

I have no desire to question these established facts. But what we must question is the standard of "school intelligence" implicit in all such tests. It is nothing but the logical bias in its most blatant form. We know the examinations and tests by means of which the standard is established. Most of us have suffered from their indignities. But now, with the support of other schools of psychology, we are in a position to challenge the whole of this logical or rationalistic tradition. We must not commit the mistake of putting forward another exclusive standard. Our science teaches us toleration. But we do assert, on evidence, that there is more than one standard of intelligence, and indeed, more than one mode of thought. The purpose of thought is to arrive at truth, and truth, we say, is not found exclusively in the possession of those with a high "intelligence quotient"; it

is just as likely to proceed out of the mouths of babes and sucklings, poets and artists, even madmen.

What has been established, by the particular school of psychology we are relying on, is that these babes and sucklings, poets and painters, visionaries of all kinds, have one thing in common—an imagination so vivid that it must be regarded as the use of the particular kind of imagery, that kind already referred to which has been called eidetic imagery. This imagery, which is natural to babes and sucklings, is in certain rare cases retained beyond adolescence and among these rare cases are to be found our poets and painters and visionaries of all kinds. But more: when we come to investigate the nature of scientific thought in so far as this thought is an inventive or creative activity, and not merely a logical arrangement of accepted facts, we find that it too relies on images. The whole of modern physics, for example, is studded with imagery, from Newton's falling apple to Eddington's man in a lift. Possibly there is more imagery in modern physics than in modern poetry.

With such facts in our hands we need not stop to defend the biological utility of the arts. We can turn on the scientists and convince them on the evidence of their own processes of thought. In so far as it is creative and biologically useful, their thought is imaginative. Yet the systems of education which they have devised, and the tests which they have imposed on children, give no marks to the imagination. Images, they say *and prove*, are not essential to efficient thought. So everything is done to suppress these inconvenient sprites and to enthrone the absolute rule of the concept in the child's mind.

The second direction from which we receive psychological support for our claims is known as the Gestalt theory. It is hardly possible to express the significance of this theory in a few simple words, but the exponents of the theory would agree that it too is in the main a protest against a logical conception of knowledge and science. What they say, in effect, is that there are no facts apart from the act or process of experiencing them, that the "facts of a case" are not grasped by enumeration, but must be felt as a coherent pattern. The word "felt" must be emphasized, for this factor of feeling in perception is aesthetic. It is not only the perception of a particular pattern, but also a discrimination in favor of that particular pattern. That is to say, out of all possible patterns of behavior, one is chosen as being particularly fit or appropriate. It feels right—one feels at once the ease with which this particular pattern is apprehended and the appropriateness of the action that ensues. And then, since this particular pattern of behavior feels right, it tends to be repeated, and other modes of behavior tend to become assimilated to it.

What the psychologists call the acquisition of a pattern of behavior is nothing but the process of learning—learning, that is to say, in the sense of acquiring skill in the doing of anything—walking, skating, weaving, painting, assembling an engine. "Grace and skill," says one of the Gestalt psychologists, "go hand in hand; their achievement is never the result of combining acts which themselves are awkward and unskilful. In order to do anything gracefully and skilfully one must first hit upon the 'fortunate variation' in behavior which is most suitable to the conditions."

This has led us back to Plato again. In that part of the *Republic* which precedes the theory of education already referred to, Plato analyzes the nature of form and rhythm, and what he says in effect is that the laws of form and rhythm are not given *a priori*, but are to be discovered in the best and most efficient actions. The following passage is from the *Republic*, and not from the work of a modern Gestalt psychologist. In studying the law of rhythms, Plato says, "We must not aim at a variety of them, or study all movements indiscriminately, but observe what are the natural rhythms of a well regulated and manly life, and when we have discovered these we must compel the foot and the music to suit themselves to the sense of such life, and not the sense itself to the foot and the music." In other words, in modern words, aesthetic laws are inherent in the biological processes of life itself; they are the laws which guide life along the path of ease and efficiency; and it is our business as educationalists to discover these laws in nature or experience and make them the principles of our teaching. Balance and symmetry, proportion and rhythm, are basic factors in experience: indeed, they are the only elements by means of which experience can be organized into persisting patterns, and it is of their nature that they imply grace, economy and efficiency. What feels right works right, and the result, as measured by the consciousness of the individual, is a heightened sense of aesthetic enjoyment.

We now come to the final aspect of the psychological evidence. It is even more difficult to summarize than the last-mentioned aspect, but for a different reason. The evidence is not complete. We have indeed got out of our

depths and we flounder in a stormy sea. The theory of the unconscious is still disputed, and we must be careful not to claim too high a therapeutic value for those forms of free expression which we wish to encourage as part of our educational methods. That the young child—the very young child—has its repressions and its complexes no less than its parents and teachers is now sufficiently evident, but the treatment of psychoses and neuroses in the child presents quite exceptional difficulties to the psychiatrist. It is not, of course, for the teacher to meddle in such matters without training, but the psychiatrist might well ask the teachers to co-operate with him. Apart from any other aspect of the question, a child's drawings, produced as a result of spontaneous activity, are direct evidence of the child's physiological and psychological disposition, and in the opinion of some professional psychoanalysts, these drawings have more clinical value than any other form of evidence. But that is an aspect of the matter for which we must seek expert guidance. There is, however, a simpler aspect which is well within our lay competence. We know that a child absorbed in drawing or in any other creative activity is a happy child. We know just as a matter of everyday experience that self-expression is self-improvement. For that reason we must claim a large portion of the child's time for artistic activities, simply on the grounds that these activities are, as it were, a safety valve, a path to equableness. That is a practical reason which might convince the reluctant logicians, but, of course, it is not our main reason for claiming a large portion of the child's time. We cannot hope to overcome the ramparts of the rationalist tradition with our real reason, for that would

seem too impracticable, too idealistic. For our real claim has no limits. We do not claim an hour or a day of the child's time; we claim the whole child. We believe that we have within our grasp a method of education of absolutely universal validity. We believe that the grace we can instil by means of music, poetry and the plastic arts is not a superficial acquirement, but the key to all knowledge and all noble behavior. We suspect that much, if not all, of the misery in the world today is due to the suppression of imagination and feeling in the child, to the prevalence of logical and rationalistic modes of thought that do violence to those principles of grace and rhythm and fair proportion which are implicit in the order of the universe. We believe that our function, not merely as artists and art teachers, but as teachers and exemplars in general, is, as Plato said in one of his most visionary flights:

"To be guided by our instinct for whatever is lovely and gracious, so that our young men, dwelling in a wholesome climate, may drink in good from every quarter, whence, like a breeze bearing health from happy regions, some influence from noble works constantly falls upon eye and ear from childhood upward, and imperceptibly draws them into sympathy and harmony with the beauty of reason, whose impress they take." [5]

4. The Uniqueness of the Person.

These influences of which Plato speaks fall upon the organs of a unique sensibility. Uniqueness is a natural fact. It is a result of the infinite permutations and combinations of the *genes* which are the agents of life transmitted and united in the process of conception. Identical

twins, by the uniqueness of their identity, give us a measure of the enormous diversity of persons in general.

This diversity is not a biological accident. It is the dialectical basis of natural selection, of human evolution. Any attempt, therefore, whether by education or coercion, to eliminate the differences between persons would frustrate the natural dissemination and growth of the human race. It is possible and even "scientific" to hold that we should attempt to control this growth, just as we have controlled the growth of species like the horse and the sheep. But such control could only be effectively exercised if we had an agreed aim in view. We breed horses for strength or speed, sheep for a finer fleece. But it is a godlike assumption to breed the human race for any predetermined quality, and the idea has only entered the minds of totalitarian philosophers like Plato and Hegel, or been the policy of extreme fanatics who have attempted to put the ideals of such philosophers into practice.

Opposed to this point of view is another equally extreme—it received its extreme expression in the philosophy of Max Stirner, to which Marx and Engels devoted some of their most destructive criticism. This philosophy asserts, with a logical consistency which some of its opponents might emulate, that all values can be received and judged only through the instrumentality of a unique sensational system, and that everything exterior to the wishes and desires of this ego is either a false rationalization of these instinctive drives or a form of self-deception which leads to frustration and eventually to aggression and self-destruction. Altruism, that is to say,

is an illusion, and only by recognizing that fact can we achieve individual happiness.

The truth, as it is manifested in events, lies somewhere between these two extremes. "History," wrote Engels, "makes itself in such a way that the final result always arises from conflicts between many individual wills, of which each again has been made what it is by a host of particular conditions of life. Thus there are innumerable intersecting forces, an infinite series of parallelograms of forces which give rise to one resultant—the historical event. This again may itself be viewed as the product of a power which, taken as a whole, works *unconsciously* and without volition. For what each individual wills is obstructed by everyone else, and what emerges is something that no one willed." [6]

It is not the purpose of education to eliminate this conflict between individual wills—the attempt would be foredoomed to failure because the conflict is inherent in our biological nature. But obviously "the historical event" would be very different if, instead of a blind clash of individual wills, we could substitute some form of willing accommodation.

Two necessary processes are involved. One we shall call *initiation;* the other, *reciprocity*. Before we can give effective direction to these processes, we must give precision to the units involved. A game cannot be played to a conclusion unless the counters have a fixed value; trade cannot be carried on without specific tokens of exchange; and in the same way a society can function harmoniously only if the individuals composing it are integrated persons, that is to say, people whose physical and mental growth has been completed, so that they are

whole and healthy, and by that very reason competent to render mutual aid.

We shall deal with the processes of initiation and reciprocity presently: but first we must fully recognize the biological significance of uniqueness. It is true that we come into the world trailing clouds of glory; a Heaven which is universal and impersonal lies about us in our infancy, and though the shades of the social prison-house begin to close on the growing boy, he is still, in Wordsworth's exact phrase, "nature's priest." Each infant mind is endowed with his share of a racial consciousness (an "archaic heritage," as Freud calls it). But this is but one component in a system of perceptions and instincts, a "vision splendid," which is unique. Why we affirm this uniqueness, and do not want it to "die away, and fade into the light of common day," why we do not want it to be "ironed out" by impersonal powers, is explained by our reading of the biological evidence. At the heart of life is what is sometimes called a *dialectic*, but which is quite simply a strife between positive and negative forces, between Love and Death; and it is out of the tension created by this strife that further vitality, or what is optimistically called progress, arises. We can even venture to say that the more definite the terms of this opposition—the sharper the conflict—the more vigorous will be the life. The first charge on the educator, therefore, is to bring the uniqueness of the individual into focus, to the end that a more vital interplay of forces takes place within each organic grouping of individuals—within the family, within the school, within society itself. The possibilities are at first evenly weighed between *hatred*, leading to crime, unhappiness and social antago-

nism, and *love* which ensures mutual aid, individual happiness and social peace. What is certain is that the more desirable outcome is not ensured simply by the forcible suppression of the less desirable instincts: the whole meaning of education is that we seek to avoid hate by *positive* means, that is to say, by encouraging the stronger growth of love, which is indeed that grain of mustard seed "which a man took, and sowed in his field, which is indeed the least of all seeds, but when it is grown, it is the greatest among herbs, and becometh a tree, so that the birds of the air come to lodge in the branches thereof."

5. The Parent and the Child

The first and most fundamental stage of education is carried on in the family circle. This fact, which in all its potentialities has always been realized by the Catholic Church, has only recently been given "scientific" demonstration through the practice of psychoanalysis. Only a tradition of education which for centuries has cultivated intellectual virtue at the expense of moral virtue could have ignored so vital a consideration. The exponents of that tradition, who have not usually seized on children before the age of seven or eight, have then tried, and often tried in vain, to "mold the character" of those committed to their care; but the truth is that "the little human being is frequently a finished product in his fourth or fifth year, and only gradually reveals in later years what lies buried in him." [7]

It is not possible to study the implications of psychoanalysis for education without becoming convinced that they are of overwhelming importance, and that it is

futile to discuss theories of education for the later stages of the child's life until we have made some reasonable provision for the first phase, during which the child is still physically dependent on its parents and largely abandoned to their care. That this care is often inspired by loving-kindness is not a sufficient guarantee of its efficiency. Children, psychologically speaking, can be killed by kindness, or "spoilt." In our present civilization we have to deal with a situation which has become a systematic hypocrisy, organized by neurotics, and into this system the child enters, not armed with powers of resistance, but doomed to conformity.

He is doomed by his impulse to imitate, or identify himself with, some adult in the family circle—usually the mother or father. But this emotional tie is not a simple choice for the child. The boy may wish to be as big and strong as his father; but at the same time he is in love (and in a very real sense) with his mother. Gradually this boy begins to feel that his father stands in his way with his mother. His identification with his father then takes on what Freud calls "a hostile coloring" and becomes identical with "the wish to replace his father in regard to his mother." The child is therefore in its earliest years caught up in a criss-cross of instinctive reactions which involve love and hate even towards the same object. This naturally leads to a mental state of insecurity or anxiety, and since the basic instinct in life is to protect one's own life—to live securely and full of contentment—there is an equally natural instinct to repress those reactions of hate which we find lead to discontent and unhappiness. But psychoanalysis has shown that an instinct is never repressed without seeking unconscious

compensation. We cannot, in this short treatise on a general subject, go into the details of all the psychological processes involved: it is sufficient to say that psychoanalysis finds in this universal situation of the infant a sufficient explanation of all those aggressive impulses, jealousies, tempers, bad manners and selfishness which it is the particular purpose of moral education to restrain or transform.

The educator must therefore ask, to what extent can this situation itself be dealt with, so that the development of these aggressive impulses is foreseen and controlled. To that question the psychoanalysts have given no very definite answer. Freud himself seems to deprecate analysis of normal children. "Such a prophylactic against nervous disease," he wrote, "which would probably be very effective, *presupposes an entirely different structure of society*. The application of psychoanalysis to education must be looked for today in quite a different direction." And he then goes on to give a definition of education which to some of his followers has seemed somewhat reactionary. "Let us get a clear idea of what the primary business of education is. The child has to learn to control its instincts. To grant it complete freedom, so that it obeys all its impulses without any restriction, is impossible . . . The function of education . . . is to inhibit, forbid and suppress, and it has at all times carried out this function to admiration. But we have learnt from analysis that it is this very suppression of instinct that involves the danger of neurotic illness . . . Education has . . . to steer its way between the Scylla of giving the instincts free play and the Charybdis of frustrating them. Unless the problem is altogether insoluble, an optimum of edu-

cation must be discoverable, which will do the most good and the least harm. It is a matter of finding out how much one may forbid, at which times *and by what methods.* And then it must be further considered that the children have very different constitutional dispositions, so that the same educational procedure cannot possibly be good for all children." [8] Later in this same paragraph Freud enumerates the task of the educator as:

(a) to recognize the characteristic constitution of each child;
(b) to guess from small indications what is going on in its unformed mind;
(c) to give him the right amount of love, and at the same time
(d) to preserve an effective degree of authority.

This approach to the first phase of the child's life has carried us beyond the family circle into the general field of education. But it should be obvious from this very brief consideration of the problem that the relationship first established between the child and its parents, and then extended to the family circle, is fundamental. Joined to the innate disposition of the child (its physically determined temperament), this first stage of growth and initiation controls all the later stages. If the behavior of parents towards their children were dependent on learning a technique (as the behavior of the teacher is held to be) the situation of mankind would be desperate. Luckily in this respect healthy parents are guided by healthy instincts, and mutual love between parents and children can prevent and heal the wounds to which we are liable. But more often than not in the modern world

parents are not healthy: they participate in a vast social neurosis, which has many causes and many aspects, but which is essentially due to that drastic suppression of the sexual impulses demanded by our modern civilization. It follows from this that the reform of education can never be a departmental affair: it is the whole man that is spiritually sick, and we cannot make him well by repressing this or that aspect of his daily existence. At the same time it is too optimistic to assume that a particular social revolution will carry all the necessary reforms in its sweep. It is man's relationship to society itself that is wrong, and none of the forms of society which at present prevails, or is in prospect, attempts to change that relationship. We change the name but not the form of that relationship. Parents, family, school, workshop, local environment—all that is still a *physical* or biological reality to which the child can be emotionally and morally related; beyond are the abstractions of church, state and nation to which only the mind responds, a mind open to all the ambiguity of words, symbols and ideals, the ground of all our misunderstandings, an unreal world which bears no correspondence to the pattern of nature.

6. The Teacher and the Child

Neither in the passage I have quoted nor elsewhere in his writings does Freud venture to suggest even the outlines of a successful *method* of education. But it will be seen that he tends to throw the burden on the individual educator: that is to say, there is no single psychologically correct system of education, but only the possibility of developing a right relationship between the particular teacher and his pupil. This is in line with the

general doctrine of psychoanalysis, which is a psychology of individuals. (The psychology of the group must seek some other name, such as phyloanalysis). The assumption is, of course, a realistic one, for however much a child may be influenced by the environment of a particular school or the general aspects of a particular discipline, the funnel through which this experience is poured into his mind is always the individual teacher. This is due, not only to the fact that it is the obvious function of the teacher to mediate between his pupil and the outer world, but even more to that process of identification to which I have already referred and which is one of the psychological mechanisms whose existence and scope have been revealed by psychoanalysis. This "earliest expression of an emotional tie with another person" (the boy with his father, for example) soon takes on complexities due to what we would normally call subjective and objective attitudes (e.g., the boy's desire to *be like* his father and the boy's desire at the same time to *have* his father). Without going into all the further complexities which ensue in the family circle, it should be obvious that a new situation arises when the child leaves the family circle for the school and finds there another adult with whom he must develop an emotional tie. The result in most cases is a transference—partial or complete—of the symptoms of identification from the parent to the teacher. Incidentally, other children are experiencing the same transference, from *different* parents to the *same* teacher, and this mutual tie is the nucleus of the first *group* in whose unity the child is likely to participate.[9] This is the situation of which the teacher has to take advantage and it is one which requires infinite

tact and charity. It easily degenerates, on his part, into an attitude of dominance, and on the part of the child, into a state of hypnotic dependence. (The parallel in the wider sphere of politics will be obvious.)

During the course of this change from absolute dependence on and ideal identification with the parent, there is established in the mind of the individual what Freud has called the "super-ego." The "ideal" element is, as it were, separated from the physical parent, and becomes the growing child's conscience, his faculty of self-observation and moral purpose. Freud himself has observed that "during the course of its growth, the super-ego also takes over the influence of those persons who have taken the place of the parents, that is to say, of persons who have been concerned in the child's upbringing, and whom it has regarded as ideal models." [10] This gives the teacher his only possibility for what is called "character-formation." Unfortunately, as Freud also pointed out, parents and teachers are seldom disinterested in this situation. Instead of teaching children a rational morality, they "follow the dictates of their own super-ego." ". . . In the education of the child they are severe and exacting. They have forgotten the difficulties of their own childhood, and are glad to be able to identify themselves fully at last with their own parents, who in their day subjected them to such severe restraints." [11]

In this way, not merely the sins, but also the prejudices and psychological abnormalities of the parents are passed on to the children from generation unto generation.

The good teacher is one who is able to break out of this vicious circle and establish a wholly personal re-

lationship with his pupil, one which is based on love and understanding for the unique personality which has been entrusted to his care. Such a teacher will not attempt to impose on his pupil arbitrary conceptions of "good" and "bad," which the child is unable to feel or understand (and which therefore lead to a state of tension or disunity which is one origin of neurosis). He will ignore the whole system of "make-believe" with its rewards and punishments, its constraints and inhibitions. He will try instead to establish a relationship of reciprocity and trust between himself and his pupil, and one of co-operation and mutual aid between all the individuals within his care. The teacher should identify himself with the pupil in the same degree that the pupil identifies himself with the teacher, and he should probably endeavor to make this process, on the pupil's part, more conscious than it would normally be. What is required is the give and take of a mutual relationship. The child is likely to develop his side of the relationship in the natural course of his development: from the teacher a more deliberate approach will be necessary, for he must really identify himself with the other person and feel and do as he does. The teacher sees the situation from both ends, the pupil from one only. In this way the teacher gradually learns to distinguish and anticipate the real needs of his pupil, and only in this way is it possible for him to accomplish those tasks which Freud assigns to the teacher—to recognize the child's disposition, to understand his mind, to love him and to preserve effective authority over him.[12]

7. The Person and the Group

If this right relationship is developed between the teacher and his pupil, and the teacher thus becomes the focus of a group of pupils who love him and trust him, it is then easy to establish the precepts of mutual aid within that group. This means that within the group—the class, the house, the school—a relationship of reciprocity has been formed which can take the place of those relationships of constraint that are normal in traditional methods of education.

If this feeling of trust in the teacher were the only psychological motive active within such a group, it is possible that complications due to envy and rivalry would ensue. But actually the group develops spontaneously a social life and cohesion which is independent of the teacher. The spontaneous emergence of groups among children has been studied by educationalists like Jean Piaget and Susan Isaacs, and a social experiment on a large scale which covers the whole development of the individual is being conducted at the Peckham Health Centre,[18] with results which fully support this thesis.

The importance of this development, in the life of the child, is that it leads the child *by natural stages* from a self-centred state of egotism to an attitude of social co-operation. There is then no question of forcing the child to recognize and accept a moral code whose justice it cannot appreciate. That abstract "sense of duty" is wholly outside the child's mental range: the child can only be coerced into its observance. But that sense of "playing the game" which emerges when children evolve their own activities is a real thing: it is a felt relation-

ship between little human beings who must co-operate to achieve their common aim. And to achieve this aim they must create a pattern—the rules of the game which give coherence and form to their activities. In such spontaneously evolved patterns, giving pleasures and satisfaction to the growing animal instincts and desires, lies hidden the pattern of a society in which all persons are free, but freely consenting to a common purpose.

It is impossible to exaggerate the fundamental nature of this aspect of education, which I have called *initiation.* At this stage of life a choice must be made which inevitably dictates the form which our society will take. In one direction we can institute objective codes of conduct and morality to which our children are introduced before the age of understanding and to which they are compelled to conform by a system of rewards and punishments. That way conducts us to an authoritarian society, governed by laws and sanctioned by military power. It is the kind of society in which most of the world now lives, ridden by neuroses, full of envy and avarice, ravaged by war and disease.

In the other direction we can avoid all coercive codes of morality, all formal conceptions of "right" and "wrong." For a morality of obedience we can substitute a morality of attachment or reciprocity, that living together in perfect charity which was once the ideal of Christianity. Believing that the spontaneous life developed by children among themselves gives rise to a discipline infinitely nearer to that inner accord or harmony which is the mark of the virtuous man, we can aim at making our teachers the friends rather than the masters of their pupils; as teachers they will not lay down ready-

made rules, but will encourage their children to carry out their own co-operative activities, and thus spontaneously to elaborate their own rules. Discipline will not be imposed, but discovered—discovered as the right, economical and harmonious way of action. We can avoid the competitive evils of the examination system, which merely serves to re-enforce the egocentrism inherent in the child: we can eliminate all ideas of rewards and punishments, substituting a sense of the collective good of the community, to which reparation for shortcomings and selfishness will be obviously due and freely given. In all things, moral and intellectual, we should act on the belief that we really possess only what we have conquered ourselves—that we are made perfect by natural habits, but slaves by social conventions; and that until we have become accustomed to beauty we are not capable of truth and goodness, for by beauty we mean the principle of harmony which is the given order of the physical universe, to which we conform and live, or which we reject and die.

8. The Freedom of the School

The reader who has followed me with agreement so far must now be prepared for some logical consequences which are at variance with the general trend of progressive thought. Progress in education throughout the civilized world has been for the most part conceived in terms of "national systems," and all our endeavors have been to make such systems more and more inclusive and more and more standardized. If only the system is perfect, we have argued, the products will be as good as possible.

We might have proceeded in other ways: we might,

for example, have concentrated on the training of teachers, and having made that perfect, said to them: "Go out into the world, and wherever there are children to listen to you, in village halls and at street corners, in highways and byways, gather little children round you and teach them as once Christ taught them." We might, that is to say, have thought of teachers as missionaries rather than as masters; and who would venture to say that the state of the world would then have been worse than it is?

There are still other possibilities. Instead of entrusting the education of children to bureaucratic organizations divorced from the main business of life, we might have developed the apprenticeship system, and made education a preparation for vocation—the doctors educating some children, the lawyers others, the engineers others, the weavers and the miners still others. Each guild or trade would have taken in its future apprentices from the beginning, much as, even now, some religious orders supervise the education from early years of those children destined to become novices. Instead of these and other possibilities, we have established *national* or *state* systems of education. In some countries, England among them, a few schools still manage to exist outside the official orbit, but unless, like some of the so-called "public" schools, they are richly endowed, they fight a losing battle against the increasing ubiquity and efficiency of the state schools.

There is no need to describe this system, because we all have experience of it. But few people are conscious of its dangers. These are of two distinct kinds.

The first of these dangers was anticipated by Godwin, and I cannot do better than repeat his warning:

"The project of a national education ought uniformly to be discouraged on account of its obvious alliance with national government. This is an alliance of a more formidable nature than the old and much contested alliance of church and state. Before we put so powerful a machine under the direction of so ambiguous an agent, it behooves us to consider well what it is that we do. Government will not fail to employ it to strengthen its hands and perpetuate its institutions. If we could even suppose the agents of government not to propose to themselves an object which will be apt to appear in their eyes not merely innocent but meritorious, the evil would none the less happen. Their views as institutors of a system of education will not fail to be analogous to their views in their political capacity: the data upon which their conduct as statesmen is vindicated will be the data upon which their instructions are founded. It is not true that our youth ought to be instructed to venerate the Constitution, however excellent; they should be instructed to venerate truth, and the Constitution only so far as it corresponded with their independent deductions of truth. Had the scheme of a national education been adopted when despotism was most triumphant, it is not to be believed that it could have forever stifled the voice of truth. But it would have been the most formidable and profund contrivance for that purpose that imagination can suggest. Still, in the countries where liberty chiefly prevails, it is reasonably to be assumed that there are important errors, and a national education has the most direct tendency to perpetuate those errors and to form all minds upon one model." [14]

It is difficult to realize that this passage was written

more than 150 years ago, before the growth of national states like France and Germany, and before the institution of totalitarian regimes which make this very use which Godwin feared of their educational system. In Great Britain they have attempted to impose certain safeguards, such as school managers and local educational authorities, but these bodies are gradually losing their independence, and the new Education Act virtually abolishes their powers. Here as elsewhere a system of national education has become potentially a system of national propaganda, designed to inculcate certain attitudes and beliefs which *may* not correspond with our independent deductions of truth. National socialism in Germany, with its wild distortions of scientific truth and of historical fact, would not have survived so long had not the government utilized the national system of education for the dissemination of the party's doctrines. The same is true of the national communism established in Russia. To regularize and nationalize the instruments of education is merely to convert these instruments into weapons of dictatorship.

A second objection to a national system of education is psychological rather than political. Mankind is naturally differentiated into many types, and to press all these types into the same mold must inevitably lead to distortions and repressions. Schools should be of many kinds, following different methods and catering to different dispositions. It might be argued that even a totalitarian state must recognize this principle, but the truth is that differentiation is an organic process, the spontaneous and roving association of individuals for particular purposes. To divide and segregate is not the same as to join

and aggregate—it is just the opposite process. The whole structure of education, as the natural process we have envisaged, falls to pieces if we attempt to make that structure rational or artificial.[15] Like life itself, animal as well as human, education must follow a principle of organic consistency: we must *feel our way* to the right units, and out of the natural grouping of these units round the biological actualities and practical activities of man, free and healthy institutions will emerge. Among these we shall find institutions in which children can mature the principle of growth innate in each one of them while at the same time they are initiated into the fellowship of their familiars.

9. A Community of Individuals

Freud was never tired of warning us of the thinness and brittleness of the shell we call civilization. "Civilized society," he writes in one place, "which exacts good conduct and does not trouble about the impulses underlying it, has thus won over to obedience a great many people who are not thereby following the dictates of their own nature. Encouraged by this success, society has suffered itself to be led into straining the normal standard to the highest possible point, and thus it has forced its members into a yet greater estrangement from their instinctual dispositions. They are consequently subjected to an unceasing suppression of instincts, the resulting strain of which betrays itself in the most remarkable phenomena of reaction and compensation formations . . . Anyone thus compelled to act continually in the sense of precepts which are not the expression of instinctual inclinations is living, psychologically speaking, beyond his

means, and might objectively be designated a hypocrite, whether this difference is clearly known to him or not. It is undeniable that our contemporary civilization is extraordinarily favorable to the production of this form of hypocrisy. One might venture to say that it is based upon such hypocrisy, and that it should have to submit to far-reaching modifications if people were to undertake to live in accordance with the psychological truth." [16] Freud himself never ventured to outline those "far-reaching modifications" which society would have to undergo for the sake of psychological truth, which I think we may assume is the same thing as psychological happiness. But he did indicate in unmistakable terms that he did not consider such necessary modifications to have been achieved under the collectivist systems of Russia and Germany.[17] For this reason Marxists have often condemned this great scientist as a reactionary, and it is true that by their insistence on the integrity of the family, for example, psychoanalysts find themselves in the company of conservative forces such as the Catholic Church. But they will not for this reason be deterred from stating the psychological truth, as they see it. That scientific obligation will also lead them to side with those political forces which oppose the state as such. Already certain followers of Freud set drastic limits to the beneficial effects of state interference. For example, Dr. Edward Glover, the director of the Psycho-analytical Institute of Great Britain, does not hesitate to declare that "state worship is a form of fetishism derived from the displacement of family dependence," and suggested further that "however useful the state may be in the regulation of material things it is nevertheless a backward and superstitious

organization.[18] Its true function is "to promote and strengthen in every possible way the status of the family within which civilization is born and maintained and by which it is transmitted."

It is important to realize that these psychologists are not recommending a particular policy on ideological grounds; they are dealing with the psychological and the physiological health of the human organism, and they assert that this health cannot be maintained unless certain conflicts which are the product of modern civilization are avoided. These conflicts arise when in the course of his childhood and youth man finds that he has to adjust himself to unreal systems of law, morality and convention—systems which are unreal because they are remote and abstract, not necessarily in conformity with his biological needs nor with the general pattern of nature. Man is born free; and everywhere he is in *mental* chains. Neurosis, crime, insanity—these are but so many symptoms of a disorder which is basic to our form of society. Man is ill-adjusted from the nursery up, and this ill-adjustment and consequent unhappiness is not something which can be prevented or removed by individual analysis—it is a group disorder and can be removed only by "far-reaching modifications" of our contemporary civilization.

We who demand freedom in education, autonomy in the school and self-government in industry are not inspired by any vague ideal of liberation. What we preach is really a discipline and a morality as formal and as fixed as any preached by church or state. But our law is given in nature, is discoverable by scientific method, and, as Aristotle points out, human beings are adapted by nature

to receive this law. Because we are so adapted, freedom, which is a vague concept to so many people, becomes a perfectly real and vivid principle, because it is a habit to which we are preconditioned by biological elements in our physical frame and nervous constitution.

Education, from this point of view, is an undeveloped science. To discover, for example, the degree of poise and co-ordination in the muscular system of the body is an art which has never yet been defined and practised. Harmony within the family, harmony within the social group, harmony within and among nations—these are no less psychophysiological problems, questions of pattern and practice, of adjustment to natural proportions and conformity to natural harmonies.

Each individual begins life as a dynamic unity. Into that original unity tensions and distortions are introduced by an unconscious and largely alien environment. It is alien because it is unconscious. Unless we were motivated by hatred towards the human race, we could not consciously introduce those abstract systems of law and morality on which the evolving body and soul of the person, born to potential unity and beauty, is disastrously stretched and deformed.

I do not pretend to know what are the exact precepts of a morality of love and mutual aid: I doubt if they can be formulated more explicitly than they were long ago in the Sermon on the Mount. But life, which is an organic growth, cannot be lived according to an abstract formula of words, but only to a pattern, and not to a pattern in the abstract sense of a defined form, but only to a living, evolving form, which obeys rules, not in stasis, but in growth. Life is movement: we cannot

halt it for a moment without killing it. The pattern is visible only in time. We can give pattern to our span of years, but we cannot, without death or distortion, give life to a pattern of law, to any "purely verbal, symbolic system of behavior." [19] The basis of a living community, the basis of individual happiness, is physiological: it is only in so far as this physiological basis has unity with nature (*physis* = nature) that society itself can have harmony and health. It is in small units—in the family circle, in the classroom and in the school—that this harmony and health must be first achieved. In so far as some abstraction called the state interferes with the integrity of these groups—and by their integrity we mean their capacity for spontaneous growth—in that degree the state is denying life and health to its citizens. Freedom is simply space for spontaneous action: men live in communities solely to secure that space.

10. Summary

I hope I may now expect from my reader a clearer understanding of what is meant by "freedom in education." We can now see that it is more exact to speak of "education for freedom" or "education for peace." But this is a misleading slogan unless we remember the means, which is the discipline of art, the only discipline to which the senses naturally submit. Art, as we have seen, is a discipline which the senses seek in their intuitive perception of form, of harmony, of proportion, of the integrity or wholeness of any experience. It is also the discipline of the tool and the material—the discipline imposed by pencil or pen, by the loom or the potter's wheel, by the physical nature of paint, textiles, wood, stone or clay.

But the point about such discipline is that it is innate: it is part of our physiological constitution, and is there to be encouraged and matured. It does not have to be imposed by the schoolmaster or the drill sergeant: it is not a kind of physical torture. It is a faculty within the child which responds to sympathy and love, to the intelligent anticipation of impulses and trends in the individuality of the child. For this reason the teacher must be primarily a person and not a pedagogue, a friend rather than a master or mistress, an infinitely patient collaborator. Put in a drier and more pedantic way, the aim of education is to discover the child's psychological type, and to allow each type its natural line of development, its natural form of integration. That is the real meaning of freedom in education.

The art of children is supremely important for this very reason: it is the earliest and most exact index to the child's individual psychology. Once the psychological tendency or trend of a child is known, its own individuality can be developed by the discipline of art, till it has its own form and beauty, which is its unique contribution to the beauties of human nature. This, of course, is the antithesis of those totalitarian doctrines of education (not confined to totalitarian countries) which strive to impose a unique concept of human nature on the infinite variety of human persons.

A child's art, therefore, is its passport to freedom, to the full fruition of all its gifts and talents, to its true and stable happiness in adult life. Art leads the child out of itself. It may begin as a lonely individual activity, as the self-absorbed scribbling of a baby on a piece of paper. But the child scribbles in order to communicate its inner

world to a sympathetic spectator, to the parent from whom it expects a sympathetic response.

Too often, alas, it receives only indifference or ridicule. Nothing is more crushing to the infant spirit than a parent's or a teacher's contempt for those creative efforts of expression. That is one aspect of a process which disgraces the whole of our intellectualized civlization and which, in my opinion, is the root cause of our social disintegration. We sow the seeds of disunity in the nursery and the classroom, with our superior adult conceit. We divide the intelligence from the sensibility of our children, create split-men (schizophrenics, to give them a psychological name), and then discover that we have no social unity.

We begin our life in unity—the physical unity of the mother and child, to which corresponds the emotional unity of love. We should build on that original unity, extending it first to the family, where the seeds of hatred are so easily and so often sown, and then to the school, and so by stages to the farm, the workshop, the village and the whole community. But the basis of unity at each successive stage, as at the first stage, is creativity. We unite to create, and the pattern of creation is in nature, and we discover and conform to this pattern by all the methods of artistic activity—by music, by dancing and drama, but also by working together and living together, for, in a sane civilization, these too are arts of the same natural pattern.

NOTES

NOTES

I

Introduction: There Is Now No Other Way

[1] For example, by Arthur Koestler in *The Yogi and the Commissar.*

[2] On this aspect of the problem I would recommend an extremely wise little book by Melanie Klein and Joan Riviere—*Love, Hate and Reparation,* London (Hogarth Press), 1937.

[3] "Those who kill lose their souls because they kill. And those who are killed lose their souls because they are killed . . . because they despair of the goodness of God." Charles Péguy: *Jeanne d'Arc.*

II

Education for Peace

[1] Introduction to *The Child's Discovery of Death,* by Sylvia Anthony, London (Kegan Paul), 1940.

[2] *New Introductory Lectures,* London (Hogarth Press), 1933, p. 139.

[3] The quotations on this page are from the extended edition of *War Sadism and Pacifism.* London (Allen & Unwin), 1947.

[4] *Emile, Bk. II,* trans. Barbara Foxley. (Everyman Library.)

III

Education in Things

[1] By W. Lloyd Warner, Robert J. Havinghurst, and Martin B. Loeb, London (Kegan Paul), 1946.

[2] Eric Gill, *Last Essays* (1942), p. 56.

IV

Culture and Education in a World Order

[1] More recently UNESCO has shown a welcome tendency to broaden its scope, and has taken steps to encourage research into the educational methods advocated in this book.

[2] *Education Through Art,* London (Faber & Faber), 1943.

[3] Cf. *Beyond Good and Evil,* § 188.

[4] *Ideen.* Zuerich (Rascher & Co.), 1927, p. 187.

V

The Moral Significance of Aesthetic Education

[1] My quotations from Herbart are generally taken from the translation by H. M. & E. Felkin (*The Science of Education,* etc., London, 1892).

[2] *Les deux sources de la morale et de la réligion.* Paris (1932), p. 31.

[3] *New Introductory Lectures,* Eng. trans. by W. J. H. Sprott, London (1933), p. 82.

[4] Herbart uses the word "Construction." I suspect that a modern German philosopher would use the word "Gestalt," and certainly something like "the good Gestalt" seems to be meant.

[5] "Judgment" is the customary translation of *Urteilskraft,* but it is a word which I do not find happily associated with the aesthetic experience. The German word more easily suggests "discernment" or "discrimination" than does the word "judgment," and "recognition" is a word which perhaps fits the experience more closely still.

[6] Wordsworth, at almost the same moment, was giving his incomparable descriptions of the child's expanding universe. Cf. his poem on the "Influence of Natural Objects in Calling Forth and Strengthening the Imagination in Boyhood and Early Youth," composed 1799.

[7] Again, cf. Wordsworth: "The Recluse," ll. 47–71, and "Lines Composed a Few Miles Above Tintern Abbey," ll. 75–111.

[8] Werner Jaeger has emphasized the significance of this doctrine for the whole background of Greek thought:

"All the marvellous principles of Greek thought—principles which have come to symbolize its most essential and indefeasible quality—were created in the sixth century. . . . One of the most decisive advances in that process was the new investigation of the structure of music. The knowledge of the true nature of harmony and rhythm produced by that investigation would alone give Greece a permanent position in the history of civilization; for it affects almost every sphere of life. . . .

"This harmony was expressed in the relation of the parts to the whole. But behind that harmony lay the mathematical conception of proportion, which, the Greeks believed, could be visually presented by geometrical figures. The harmony of the world is a complex idea: it means both musical harmony, in the sense of a beautiful concord between different sounds, and harmonious mathematical structure on rigid geometrical rules. The subsequent influence of the conception of harmony on all aspects of Greek life was immeasurably great. It affected not only sculpture and architecture, but poetry and rhetoric, religion and morality; all Greece came to

realize that whatever a man made or did was governed by a severe rule, which like the rule of justice could not be transgressed with impunity—the rule of fitness or propriety (πρέπον, ἁρμόττον). Unless we trace the boundless working of this law in all spheres of Greek thought throughout classical and post-classical times, we cannot realize the powerful educative influence of the discovery of harmony. The conceptions of rhythm, relation, and of the mean are closely akin to it, or derive from it a more definite content. It is true not only of the idea of the cosmos, but also of harmony and rhythm, that it was necessary for Greece to discover their existence in 'the nature of being' before she could employ them in the spiritual world, to find order and method in human life." (*Paideia, the Ideals of Greek Culture.* Trans. by Gilbert Highet. Oxford (Blackwell), 3rd edn. Vol. I (1946), pp. 164–5.

[9] Trans. A. E. Taylor, London (Dent), 1934.

[10] *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.* Eng. trans. (2nd edn., 1940), p. 70.

[11] *Op. cit.,* pp. 65–6. My italics.

[12] Werner Jaeger points out (*op. cit.,* II, n. 86, p. 403) that in discussing the various types of poetry in the *Republic,* Plato uses *imitation* to mean "not copying some natural object or other, but the process by which the poet or actor assimilates himself (ὁμοιοῦν ἑαυτόν) to the person whom he is portraying, and thereby extinguishes his own personality for the time being." This is an accurate description of the process of *empathy.*

VI

The Education of Free Men

[1] This is, of course, a translator's phrase (Davies and Vaughan) and not always adopted by other translators. But it represents accurately enough Plato's general meaning.

[2] *The Laws of Plato.* Trans. into English by A. E. Taylor, M.A., D. Litt., LL.D., London (J. M. Dent & Sons), 1934.

[3] *The Grammarian's Funeral.*

[4] Charles Fox, *Educational Psychology,* London, 1930, p. 86.

[5] Trans. by F. S. Cornford (Oxford Univ. Press).

[6] Tolstoi expressed a similar view of history in *War and Peace.*

[7] Freud: *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis* (1922), p. 298.

[8] *New Introductory Lectures* (1933), pp. 191–2. (My italics.)

[9] "A primary group of this kind is a number of individuals who have substituted one and the same object for their ego ideal

and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego."—Freud: *Group Psychology and Analysis of Ego,* p. 80.

[10] *New Introductory Lectures,* p. 87.

[11] *Ibid.,* p. 90.

[12] Godwin, in an essay, "On the Obtaining of Confidence," long ago expressed this truth in words which have lost none of their relevance to this discussion:

"If any man desire to possess himself of the most powerful engine that can be applied to the purpose of education, if he would find the ground upon which he must stand to enable himself to move the whole substance of the mind, he will probably find it in sympathy. Great power is not necessarily a subject of abuse. A wise preceptor would probably desire to be in possession of great power over the mind of his pupil, though he would use it with economy and diffidence. He would therefore seek by all honest arts to be admitted into his confidence, that so the points of contact between them may be more extensively multiplied, that he may not be regarded by the pupil as a stranger of the outer court of the temple, but that his image may mix itself with his pleasures, and be made the companion of his recreations." *Enquirer,* pp. 124–5.

[13] " 'Community' is not formed merely by the aggregation of persons assembled for the convenience of sustaining some ulterior purpose, as in a housing estate connected with a single industry; not by the aggregation of individuals kept in contiguity by the compulson of necessity, as in 'special areas' wrecked by unemployment; nor held together, as in some social settlements, by the doubtful adhesive of persuasion; nor indeed meeting the needs of war time as in 'Communal Feeding,' 'Communal Nurseries.' Its characteristic is that it is the result of a *natural functional organisation in society,* which brings *its own* intrinsic impetus to ordered growth and development. In our understanding, 'community' is built up of *homes* linked with *society* through a functional zone of mutuality. As it grows in mutuality of synthesis it *determines its own* anatomy and physiology, according to biological law. A community is thus a specific 'organ' of the body of society and is formed of living and growing cells—the homes of which it is composed." *The Peckham Experiment, a Study in the Living Structure of Society.* By Innes H. Pearse, M.D., and Lucy H. Crocker, B.Sc., London (Allen & Unwin), 1943, pp. 291–2.

[14] *Political Justice,* VI, 8.

[15] Such a "rational" organization is attempted in England by the new Education Act. The division of secondary schools into three types, grammar, technical and modern, represents artificial categories based on "aptitudes" determined by a cursory examination held at the immature age of 10–11. Subsequent interchange between these categories is legally possible, but administratively difficult and there-

fore unlikely. The articulation proposed here is regional or local, the smallest units being nursery schools, several of which feed a primary school, of which in turn several feed a secondary school—the schools increasing in size as they cater to higher age groups and wider areas but always remaining "multilateral" in their curricula. Only in this way can we hope to retain that dialectical interplay between diverse dispositions which is the basis of a natural character-formation. The vocational segregation of "like-minded" children from the age of eleven onward can lead only to intellectual dullness and social apathy. Birds of a feather flock together, but it is now proposed that they should be caged together.

[16] *Collected Papers,* Vol. IV, "Thoughts for the Times on War and Death." Schiller said very much the same in his *Letters upon the Aesthetical Education of Man:* "In this way individual concrete life is gradually extinguished, in order that the abstract whole may prolong its miserable existence, and the state remains for ever a stranger to its citizens, because it is nowhere present to their feelings. Compelled to reduce to some order the multiplicity of its citizens by classifying them, and only to know humanity through representation at second hand, the governing classes end by altogether losing sight of their citizens, reducing them to some figment of the mind. Meanwhile the subject classes cannot but welcome coldly laws which are so little addressed to them personally. In the end, tired of a bondage which the state does so little to lighten, positive society disintegrates—a fate which has long ago overcome most European states. It dissolves into a moral state of nature, in which the public authority is nothing more than a class, hated and betrayed by those who make its existence necessary, respected only by those who can do without it."

[17] Cf. especially *New Introductory Lectures,* Lecture XXXV, "A Philosophy of Life."

[18] "State Parentalism," *New English Weekly,* March 23, 1944.

[19] Dr. Trigant Burrow.

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